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 There has been a good deal of talk lately to the effect that Miranda1 is 
dead or dying—or might as well be dead.2 Even liberals have indicated 
that the death of Miranda might not be a bad thing.3 
This brings to mind a saying by G.K. Chesterton: “Don’t ever take a 
fence down until you know the reason why it was put up.”4 
                                                     
1. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
2. See RICHARD LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 280–83 (2008); Barry 
Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (with Particular Attention to Miranda v. Arizona), 99 
GEO. L.J. 1 (2010); Christopher Slobogin, Toward Taping, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 309 (2003); 
George C. Thomas III, Miranda’s Illusion: Telling Stories in the Police Interrogation Room, 81 
TEX. L. REV. 1091, 1092–95 (2003); cf. Welsh S. White, Miranda’s Failure to Restrain Pernicious 
Interrogation Practices, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1211, 1246 (2001) (“[A]s interpreted by the post-
Miranda Court, the extent to which Miranda’s safeguards protect suspects from pernicious 
interrogation practices is extremely limited.”). 
3. See Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1519, 1523–25, 1590–1600 
(2008). 
4. The saying is usually attributed to G.K. Chesterton. See, e.g., ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., A 
THOUSAND DAYS: JOHN F. KENNEDY IN THE WHITE HOUSE 106 (1965) (noting that President 
Kennedy kept a collection of sayings in a notebook, including the one set forth in the text—which 
he attributed to G.K. Chesterton). Judge William C. Griesbach, The Joy of Law, 92 MARQ. L. REV. 
889, 892 (2009), also credits Chesterton with this saying. 
  However, the saying seems to be a paraphrase or compressed version of what Chesterton actually 
said. His point was that if you find a fence in a certain place, somebody might have had a good 
reason for putting one there. Until you know what that reason might be, you should not consider 
tearing the fence down. See The Drift from Domesticity, in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF G.K. 
CHESTERTON 157, 157 (1990). 
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I.  WHY DID THE WARREN COURT BELIEVE SOMETHING 
LIKE MIRANDA WAS NEEDED? 
Why was the “Miranda fence” erected? Because the “fence” it 
replaced—the due process/“totality of circumstances”/“voluntariness” 
test—proved to be “an inadequate barrier when custodial interrogation 
was at stake.”5 As the “voluntariness” test evolved, the terms typically 
used in administering it (e.g., “voluntariness,” “coercion,” “breaking” or 
“overbearing” the will) became increasingly unhelpful. They did not 
focus directly on either of the two grounds for excluding confessions: (a) 
their untrustworthiness or (b) disapproval of the methods used by the 
police in obtaining them.6 
Nor is that all. As Stephen Schulhofer has observed, because of its 
sponginess and “subtle mixture of factual and legal elements,”7 the pre-
Miranda test “virtually invited” trial judges to “give weight to their 
subjective preferences” and “discouraged active review even by the most 
conscientious appellate judges.”8 
                                                     
5. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2408 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., for a 5-4 
majority). In the course of arguing successfully in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), 
that a 1968 federal statute purporting to abolish Miranda (a statute widely known as § 3501) should 
be struck down as unconstitutional, the U.S. Department of Justice “recall[ed] that the Miranda 
Court arrived at its solution only after concluding that the ‘totality of circumstances’ voluntariness 
test, as the sole protection for the Fifth Amendment rights of a custodial suspect, had failed . . . . It 
was inadequate because a ‘totality’ test, without more, provided insufficient guidance to the police, 
left inadequate means for this Court to unify and expound the law, and resulted in an uncertain legal 
rule that could not secure the vital constitutional rights at stake.” Reply Brief for the United States at 
20, Dickerson, 530 U.S. 428 (No. 99-5525). 
6. This was pointed out more than a decade before Miranda. See Monrad Paulsen, The 
Fourteenth Amendment and the Third Degree, 6 STAN. L. REV. 411, 418–19, 429–30 (1954); see 
also Francis Allen, The Supreme Court, Federalism, and State Systems of Criminal Justice, 8 
DEPAUL L. REV. 213, 235 (1959). As Louis Michael Seidman has pointed out, at the very end of his 
long career, in Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1991) (plurality opinion), Justice Frankfurter 
tried to make sense of, and to defend, the “voluntariness” test—in “sixty-seven pages of elegantly 
written prose.” Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 673, 730–33 (1992). 
“Despite his herculean effort,” Frankfurter “succeeded in attracting only one other Justice to his 
opinion” (Stewart). Id. at 732. “[T]he Justices who concurred [with Frankfurter] on an analytical 
framework for resolving the problem disagreed on the result produced by that framework, while the 
Justices who concurred on the result disagreed on the analytic framework producing the result. In 
short, the Culombe opinion was a total disaster.” Id. at 733. 
7. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 MICH. L. REV. 865, 869–70 (1981). 
8. Id. Even the late Bill Stuntz, one of Miranda’s strongest critics, recognized that: 
[T]he three decades before Miranda showed that a case-by-case voluntariness inquiry sorted 
badly, and at least part of the reason was that courts had a very hard time judging, case by case, 
the difference between good and bad police interrogation tactics . . . . By 1966, the 
voluntariness standard seemed to be failing, and so could not do the job for which it was 
designed: It could not separate good police tactics and good confessions from bad ones.  
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“Given the Court’s inability to articulate a clear and predictable 
definition of ‘voluntariness,’ the apparent persistence of state courts in 
utilizing the ambiguity of the concept to validate confessions of doubtful 
constitutionality, and the resultant burden on [the Court’s] own 
workload,”9 it is hardly surprising that in 1966 what might be called the 
“voluntariness fence” was finally torn down in favor of a new one. 
If a picture is worth a thousand words, perhaps the same can be said 
for a specific case and its graphic details. I am not going to return to the 
1930s and 40s, when police interrogators sometimes resorted to the whip 
or the rope. I am only going to recall a case decided in the late 1970s—
Mincey v. Arizona.10 
As I shall discuss shortly, the first blow the post-Warren Court dealt 
Miranda was in 1971. That year the Burger Court told us that even 
though statements obtained in violation of Miranda could not be used in 
the prosecution’s case-in-chief, they could still be used to impeach the 
defendant’s credibility if he testified on his own behalf.11 However, the 
prosecution could not use the defendant’s statements for any purpose if 
they were “coerced” or “involuntary.” The question presented in the 
Mincey case was not whether the police had violated Miranda (the state 
conceded they had), but whether they had failed to satisfy the 
voluntariness test. 
During a narcotics raid on Mincey’s apartment, a police officer was 
shot and killed. Mincey himself was shot in the hip. According to the 
attending physician, Mincey “arrived at the hospital ‘depressed almost to 
the point of coma.’”12 Tubes were then placed in his throat to help him 
breathe, a catheter was inserted into his bladder and a device was 
attached to his arm so that he could be fed intravenously. Mincey was 
                                                     
William J. Stuntz, Miranda’s Mistake, 99 MICH. L. REV. 975, 980–81 (2001). 
  Because suspects may not be in custody when they are interrogated by the police or because they 
may validly waive their rights before being questioned by the police, the due process/voluntariness 
test is still very much alive. But I know of no reason to believe that the test is any more manageable 
today than it was in pre-Miranda days. After reading thousands of “voluntariness” cases from 1985 
to 2005, Paul Marcus, It’s Not Just About Miranda: Determining the Voluntariness of Confessions 
in Criminal Prosecutions, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 601 (2006), concludes that the test “offers almost no 
guidelines for lawyers and judges” and that the rules governing the test “are just as poorly and 
inconsistently applied as they were in the 1950s and 1960s. In comparison, the imprecisely bright 
line rules of Miranda look very good.” Id. at 643–44. 
9. Geoffrey R. Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 SUP. CT. REV. 99, 102–03 
(1977). 
10. 437 U.S. 385 (1978) (per Stewart, J.). 
11. See infra notes 75–95 and accompanying text. 
12. Mincey, 437 U.S. at 398. 
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then taken to the intensive care unit.13 
At eight o’clock that evening, a detective came to the intensive care 
unit to question Mincey about the slaying of the police officer. Unable to 
talk because of the tubes in his mouth, Mincey could only respond to the 
detective’s questions by writing his answers on pieces of paper provided 
by the hospital.14 As the Court described the situation, “while Mincey 
was being questioned he was lying on his back on a hospital bed, 
encumbered by tubes, needles, and breathing apparatus. He 
was . . . unable to escape or resist the thrust of [the detective’s] 
interrogation.”15 
When given the warnings required by Miranda, Mincey invoked his 
Miranda rights. But to no avail. “Although [he] asked repeatedly that the 
interrogation stop until he could get a lawyer, [the detective] continued 
to question him until almost midnight.”16 
Although it is hard to believe, the Arizona courts concluded that 
Mincey’s confession was “voluntary.” The Supreme Court reversed, but 
the vote was not unanimous. Justice Rehnquist dissented, maintaining 
(as other Justices had in the pre-Miranda “voluntariness” cases) that “the 
Court today goes too far in substituting its own judgment for the 
judgment of a trial court and the highest court of a State, both of which 
decided these disputed issues differently than does this Court, and both 
of which were a good deal closer to the factual occurrences than is this 
Court.”17 
One might say that the Mincey case demonstrates that the 
administration of the “voluntariness” test does work. After all, the 
judgment of the Arizona Supreme Court was reversed in that case. But 
we should keep in mind that in the thirty years between Brown v. 
Mississippi18 (the first state due process/“voluntariness” case the 
Supreme Court ever reviewed) and Miranda, the High Court decided an 
                                                     
13. See id. at 396. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. at 399. 
16. Id. at 396. Moreover, at the time the detective asked the questions, he made no record of 
them. In a report dated about a week later, the detective “transcribed Mincey’s answers and added 
the questions he believed he had asked.” Id. (emphasis added). 
17. Id. at 410. Mincey was not the only time state courts ruled that a confession obtained from a 
wounded and hospitalized person was “voluntary” only to have the U.S. Supreme Court reverse. In 
Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35 (1967) (per curiam), a confession was obtained from a murder 
suspect while (a) he was bleeding from a bullet wound in his leg (which was amputated soon 
afterwards) and (b) he was under the influence of a morphine injection that had been given to him to 
ease his pain. Id. at 36–37. 
18. 297 U.S. 278 (1936). 
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average of only one state confession case per year.19 And most of them 
were death penalty cases.20 As Justice Black said of the due 
process/“voluntariness” test during the Miranda oral arguments, “[I]f 
you are going to determine it [the admissibility of the confession] each 
time on the circumstances . . . [if] this Court will take them one by 
one . . . it is more than we are capable of doing.”21 
II.  CONFUSION OVER, AND RESISTANCE TO, MIRANDA 
To a considerable extent, Miranda was going to turn on how broadly 
or narrowly the Court would read Escobedo v. Illinois.22 Because the 
defendant in Escobedo had both requested and retained counsel, it was 
possible to read Escobedo quite narrowly. But the Warren Court was 
highly unlikely to do so. Even James Thompson, who had the distinction 
of making the losing argument in Escobedo, recognized this. Indeed, 
Thompson came quite close to predicting what the Miranda warnings 
would be.23 
But other predictions of what the Warren Court would tell us in 
Miranda proved to be wide of the mark. A month before Miranda was 
decided, Henry Friendly, a member of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
                                                     
19. Counting Brown, the Supreme Court decided thirty-five state confession cases from 1936 
through 1965. See National Legal Aid and Defender Association, Defender Newsletter, Vol. II, no. 
5, Sept. 1965. 
20. See E. BARRETT PRETTYMAN, JR., DEATH AND THE SUPREME COURT 297–98, 305 (1961). 
21. See 63 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 881, 894 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975) (quoting 
oral argument of Mr. Victor Earle for petitioner in Vignera v. New York, companion case to 
Miranda). 
22. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). 
23. As assistant director of the Northwestern Law School’s Criminal Law Program, Thompson 
told a group of prosecuting attorneys shortly after Escobedo was handed down that even if a suspect 
had neither retained nor requested counsel the police should inform him of his right to remain silent 
and that anything he said could be used against him. Moreover, added Thompson, even though a 
suspect had not asked for a lawyer or indicated that he knew he had a right to one, “absolute 
compliance with the Escobedo rule may well require a warning of the right to counsel, along with 
the warning of the privilege against self incrimination.” 
  Thompson emphasized that “in no other area of the criminal law has the Supreme Court taken 
more pains to carefully scrutinize the application of the doctrine of waiver by uncounseled 
defendants than in the area of the waiver of the right to counsel itself. Verbal waivers related to 
police officers, contradicted by the defendant at the trial, will almost certainly not pass muster.” 
Substantial extracts from Thompson’s remarks appear in Yale Kamisar, Equal Justice in the 
Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal Procedure, in YALE KAMISAR, FRED INBAU & 
THURMAN ARNOLD, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR TIME 66–68 (A.E. Dick Howard ed., 1965). 
  A young Northwestern University law professor at the time he argued Escobedo, Thompson later 
became Governor of Illinois. 
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Second Circuit and one of the most respected judges in the nation, 
balked at “conditioning” police questioning “on the presence of 
counsel.”24 To do so, maintained Judge Friendly, is “really saying that 
there may be no effective, immediate questioning by the police” and 
“that is not a rule that society will long endure.”25 
We shall never know how long society would endure such a rule 
because neither the Warren Court nor any other court ever handed down 
such a rule. As Justice Sandra Day O’Connor reminded us, speaking for 
the Court twenty years later, Miranda rejected the ACLU’s argument 
that nothing less than “the actual presence of a lawyer” was required to 
assure the admissibility of an incriminating statement (as opposed 
merely to a police warning that the suspect had a right to a lawyer).26 
Nonetheless, this did not prevent the author of a well-known book on the 
Warren Court’s “revolution” in American criminal procedure from 
leading us to believe that one of the reasons Miranda was so heavily 
criticized was that it “condition[ed] questioning on the presence of 
counsel.”27 
Even those who welcomed Miranda recognize that the Warren Court 
blundered when it applied Miranda to all cases tried after the date of the 
decision—even though the police interrogation had occurred and the 
confession had been obtained before the Miranda case had been 
decided.28 By doing so, the Court confused many people and led them to 
believe that “Miranda had affected police interrogation far more than it 
actually had.”29 
In the weeks immediately following Miranda, a number of self-
confessed killers did walk free. This was bound to anger many people. 
Lawyers may have understood that the confessions being thrown out 
involved “only a relatively tiny, special group,”30 but a great many 
                                                     
24. Remarks of Judge Henry Friendly, 43 A.L.I. PROC. 250–52 (1966) (emphasis added). 
25. Id. at 250; see also Symposium, Has the Court left the Attorney-General Behind?, 54 KY. L.J. 
464, 521, 520, 523 (1966) (pre-Miranda), where a highly regarded state judge, Walter Schaefer of 
the Illinois Supreme Court, maintained that effective criminal law enforcement “is not compatible 
with a prohibition of station house interrogation or with the presence of a lawyer during [such 
interrogation].” 
26. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426 (1986) (emphasis added). 
27. FRED GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND 7 (1970). 
28. See Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966). 
29. See GRAHAM, supra note 27, at 184. 
30. Id. at 185. The Warren Court soon realized its mistake. A year later, when it applied the right 
to counsel to lineups and other pretrial identifications in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 
(1967), the Court limited the new ruling to identifications conducted in the absence of counsel after 
the date of the Wade decision. 
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people did not. They believed, rather, that self-confessed killers “would 
continue to go free, so long as the Miranda case remained on the 
books”—providing “tremendous emotional impact to the argument that 
voluntary confessions should be usable in court, as they always had 
been.”31 
But Miranda ran into a more formidable (and more enduring) 
problem—what might be called the great tensions and violence of the 
times. As Fred Graham, then the Supreme Court correspondent for the 
New York Times, observed: 
No one could have known [when the Court began to restrain the 
power of the nation’s police in the 1960s] that it would coincide 
with the most troubled period of violent crime and racial unrest 
that has occurred in the [twentieth] century. As it turned out, the 
cycles of legal reform and rising crime and racial tensions 
moved in uncanny rhythm . . . . In 1962, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation’s crime index swung upward, after several stable 
years. By the mid-1960s, record crime increases were being 
registered each year and waves of Negro riots were raking the 
cities each summer . . . . History has played cruel jokes before, 
but few can compare with the coincidence in timing between the 
rise in crime, violence and racial tensions in the United States 
and the Supreme Court’s campaign to strengthen the rights of 
criminal suspects against the state . . . . [T]he Supreme Court’s 
reform campaign eventually encountered a monumental 
incongruity—the Court had announced the most rigid legal 
limitations that any society had sought to impose on its police at 
a time when the United States had the most serious crime 
problem of any so-called advanced nation in the world.32 
III.  THE POLITICIANS GET INTO THE ACT 
Unfortunately, too many politicians could not resist the temptation to 
blame the rising crime and racial tensions on cases like Escobedo and 
Miranda. A striking example is the performance of Senator John 
McClellan, who chaired the Senate subcommittee hearings on the 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,33 the Act that 
contained a provision (generally known as § 3501) purporting to abolish 
Miranda and to replace it with the old “voluntariness” test. 
                                                     
31. See GRAHAM, supra note 27, at 186. 
32. Id. at 3–4. 
33. 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1994). 
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When Senator McClellan urged the need to pass § 3501, he propped 
up a huge facsimile of the FBI’s crime graph. “The titles of key Supreme 
Court decisions were marked at the peaks along the rising line, to show 
the embarrassing parallel between Supreme Court activity on behalf of 
defendants and the crime rise.”34 McClellan then said: 
Look at [the crime graph] chart. Look at it and weep for your 
country. Crime spiraling upward and upward and upward. 
Apparently nobody is willing to put on the brakes. I say to my 
colleagues today that the Senate has the opportunity—and the 
hour of decisions is fast approaching35 . . . .   
. . . [If this bill is defeated] every gangster and overlord of the 
underworld; . . . every murderer, rapist, robber . . . will have 
cause to rejoice and celebrate.36 
Senator Sam Ervin turned out to be McClellan’s chief lieutenant. 
And, he, too, was quite forceful: 
If you believe that the people of the United States should be 
ruled by a judicial oligarchy composed of five Supreme Court 
Justices rather than by the Constitution of the United States, you 
ought to vote against title II. If you believe that self-confessed 
murderers, rapists, robbers, arsonists, burglars, and thieves ought 
to go unpunished, you ought to vote against [this bill] . . . . 37 
. . . [The Miranda majority subscribed] to the strange theory that 
no man should be allowed to confess his guilt, even though the 
Bible says [and others declare] that an honest “confession is 
good for the soul.” Hence, [the Miranda majority] invented 
rules . . . to keep people from confessing their crimes and sins.38 
Both the Senate and the House passed the bill by overwhelming 
margins. The vote was an astonishing 72 to 4 in the Senate and equally 
lopsided in the House—369 to 17.39 
True, from the outset, the constitutionality of § 3501 was in serious 
                                                     
34. Id. at 12. 
35. See 114 CONG. REC. 14,146 (May 21, 1968) (statement of Sen. McClellan). 
36. Id. at 14,155. 
37. Id. at 14,155 (statement of Sen. Ervin). 
38. Id. at 14,030. 
39. See Yale Kamisar, Can (Did) Congress “Overrule” Miranda?, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 883, 
893, 894 (2000). June 5, 1968, the day the House began consideration of the Senate bill, was also 
the day Senator Robert F. Kennedy was assassinated. Some Congressmen cited the assassination as 
a reason for prompt action on the Senate bill. This was ironic. According to Senator Kennedy’s 
legislative assistant, Peter Edelman, the Senator was “very deeply opposed” to the bill purporting to 
abolish Miranda. See id. at 893–94, 894 n.63. 
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doubt (although the issue was not resolved until more than thirty years 
later).40 Nevertheless, as one commentator observed shortly after § 3501 
was enacted, “it expresses a mood that the Court is not likely to ignore 
when [cases] involving the application, and particularly the extension, of 
Miranda come before it.”41 
Republican presidential candidate Richard Nixon demonstrated that 
when it came to blaming the Supreme Court for rising crime rates and 
other social ills, he yielded to no southern Democrat. In a typical 
campaign speech, Nixon would report that a cab driver, an old woman, 
and an old man were brutally murdered, but in all three cases the killer 
was “let off”— even though he had confessed to the crime—“because of 
a Supreme Court decision.”42 
As Frank Allen has noted, Mr. Nixon reduced “the bewildering 
problems of crime in the United States” to “a war between the ‘peace 
forces’ and the ‘criminal forces.’”43 Nixon mentioned Miranda and 
Escobedo specifically. These two cases, he charged, “have had the effect 
of seriously ham stringing the peace forces in our society and 
strengthening the criminal forces”—and “[t]he balance must be shifted 
back.”44 
Mr. Nixon’s unhappiness with the Supreme Court turned out to be 
more significant than Congress’s. He was elected President and in his 
first term he made four Supreme Court appointments: Warren Burger, 
Harry Blackmun, Lewis Powell, Jr., and William Rehnquist. 
The new President did his best to make sure none of his appointees 
were enamored of the Warren Court’s “revolution” in criminal 
procedure. And none of them were. Nor did President Nixon have any 
                                                     
40. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
41. Anthony G. Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 785, 810 (1970). 
42. See GRAHAM, supra note 27, at 15. 
43. Francis A. Allen, The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: The Warren Court and the Criminal 
Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 518, 539 (1975), referring to Mr. Nixon’s position paper on crime, Toward 
Freedom from Fear, dated May 8, 1968 [hereinafter Nixon, Position Paper on Crime], available at 
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/xfe16b00/pdf;jsessionid=B3108BC30B410939156F8DCF38F2F11
4.tobacco03. 
44. Id. In his position paper Mr. Nixon emphasized that at the time only “one of eight major 
crimes . . . results in arrest, prosecution, conviction and punishment – and a twelve percent chance 
of punishment is not adequate to deter a man bent on a career in crime.” Id. This one-in-eight 
statistic is highly misleading. Even if all arrests led to prosecutions and convictions, only one 
reported crime in six would result in a conviction because only one reported crime in six leads to 
criminal prosecution. Most reported crimes never lead to an arrest. See Yale Kamisar, How to Use, 
Abuse—and Fight Back with—Crime Statistics, 25 OKLA. L. REV. 239 (1972). 
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reason to think otherwise.45 That President Nixon was successful in this 
respect should come as no surprise. By the time a person is old enough 
to be considered for the U.S. Supreme Court, he or she is more likely to 
have made up his or her mind about the death penalty, the search and 
seizure exclusionary rule, and Miranda than on most matters. 
IV.  PRESIDENT NIXON NOMINATES WARREN BURGER TO BE 
CHIEF JUSTICE 
According to then-candidate Nixon, the Warren Court’s pro-
defendant criminal procedure cases underscored the need for future 
presidents to appoint Supreme Court justices “who are thoroughly 
experienced and versed in the criminal laws of the land.”46 But Warren 
Burger had no background in criminal law. Ironically, Earl Warren, the 
person Burger replaced, did. In fact, Warren had been a prosecutor for 
eighteen years. Moreover, he had actually interrogated murder 
                                                     
45. Warren Burger and William Rehnquist are discussed in the text below. As for future Justice 
Powell, he was appointed by President Lyndon Johnson to the Commission on Law Enforcement 
and Administration of Justice in 1965. The Commission issued its report two years later. Mr. Powell 
was one of seven members of the Commission to sign a supplemental statement expressing great 
concern about the adverse impact of Escobedo and Miranda on law enforcement. He and the six 
other commission members maintained that “the legitimate place of voluntary confessions in law 
enforcement must be reestablished” by returning to the pre-Miranda “voluntariness” test even if, “as 
now appears likely, a constitutional amendment is required.” See THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A 
FREE SOCIETY: A REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND 
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 303, 307–08 (1967). The supplemental statement also stressed the 
need to allow for comment on the failure of a defendant to take the stand in his own defense and the 
need for reciprocal discovery in criminal cases—again, by a constitutional amendment, if necessary. 
See id. 
  As for Harry Blackmun, he and Warren Burger were close friends since childhood. In 1961, when 
both were federal court of appeals judges, Burger had felt comfortable enough with Blackmun to 
write him a letter referring to “those bastards on the Supreme Court who . . .  ‘turn every criminal 
appeal into a quest for error.’” SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN: LIBERAL 
CHAMPION 244 (2010). Shortly before he was nominated to be Chief Justice, Burger (at the 
suggestion of President Nixon) had sent Attorney General John Mitchell some Supreme Court 
recommendations and Harry Blackmun’s name had been on the list. As Nixon aide John Ehrlichman 
put it, Blackmun “could be expected to follow closely the new Chief Justice’s lead.” JOHN D. 
EHRLICHMAN, WITNESS TO POWER: THE NIXON YEARS 129 (1982). 
  Linda Greenhouse, in her article LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN 186 (2005), 
notes that Chief Justice Burger “had clearly believed that [Justice] Blackmun would enlist in his 
causes, but his agenda was not Blackmun’s. It did not take long for that fact to become clear.” 
Greenhouse then points to a study showing that in his first five years on the Court, Blackmun voted 
with Burger in 87.5% of the closely divided cases, but in the next ten years Blackmun voted more 
often with Justice Brennan than with the Chief Justice. 
46. See Nixon, Position Paper on Crime, supra note 43. 
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suspects.47 On top of that, he had been California’s Attorney General for 
four years.48 He probably had a more extensive background in criminal 
law enforcement than anyone who has ever served on the U.S. Supreme 
Court. 
Nixon did not want to put people on the Court who happened to be 
“thoroughly experienced” in criminal law. He sought people rather who 
were likely to be “law-and-order” justices regardless of whether they had 
any background in criminal law. He wanted people like Warren Burger. 
In his dissenting opinions and public speeches, Judge Burger had left 
no doubt that he was quite unhappy with the Warren Court’s criminal 
procedure rulings—and equally unhappy with the liberal judges on his 
own court.49 Dissenting in a 1967 case, Burger observed: 
I suggest that the kind of nit-picking appellate review exhibited 
by reversal of this conviction may help explain why the public is 
losing confidence in the administration of justice. I suggest also 
that if we continue on this course we may well come to be 
known as a society incapable of defending itself—the impotent 
society.50 
Dissenting in a 1969 confession case, one decided only a short time 
before he was nominated to be Chief Justice, Burger maintained: 
We are well on our way to forbidding any utterance of an 
accused to be used against him unless it is made in open court. 
Guilt or innocence becomes irrelevant in the criminal trial as we 
flounder in a morass of artificial rules poorly conceived and 
often impossible of application.51 
Before ascending to the Supreme Court, Burger did not restrict his 
criticism of the American criminal justice system to his dissenting 
opinions as a federal judge. He also had his say in speeches and articles. 
In a 1964 speech,52 Burger trashed the search and seizure 
                                                     
47. See Yale Kamisar, How Earl Warren’s Twenty-Two Years in Law Enforcement Affected His 
Work as Chief Justice, 3 OHIO ST. L.J. 11–12 (2005). 
48. See id. 
49. By the time Judge Burger was nominated to be Chief Justice, it was plain that he had become 
the principal antagonist of the liberal Chief Judge of his court, David Bazelon. But the intensity of 
Burger’s dislike of Bazelon was not as well known. According to STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 
45, “Burger privately mocked Bazelon in letters as ‘Baz’ and called in Washington reporters for off-
the-record conversations in which he dismissed [Bazelon] as ‘misguided,’ ‘pathetic,’ and ‘a menace 
to society.’ [Justice] Brennan heard all about the conflict from Bazelon. ‘It was a blood feud, there 
isn’t any doubt about that,’ Brennan said.” Id. at 243. 
50. Borum v. United States, 380 F.2d 595, 602 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (Burger, J., dissenting). 
51. Frazier v. United States, 419 F.2d 1161, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Burger, J., dissenting). 
52. Warren E. Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman?, 14 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1964). 
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exclusionary rule, doubting whether the rule (he liked to call it the 
Suppression Doctrine, perhaps because that sounded more ominous) was 
ever anything more than “wishful thinking.”53 And he wondered 
“whether any community is entitled to call itself an ‘organized society’ 
if it can find no way to solve this problem [police engaging in 
unreasonable searches or seizures] except by suppression of truth in the 
search for truth.”54 
A 1967 speech by Judge Burger, reprinted in U.S. News & World 
Report,55 caught the attention and the approval of future President 
Nixon.56 Burger’s 1967 article sounded a good deal like a Nixon 
campaign speech—perhaps because “Nixon referred to and quoted from 
the Burger article often during his 1968 campaign.”57 Judge Burger’s 
article deplored America’s high crime rate and stressed the need to shift 
the balance in favor of law and order. The article began: 
People murder others in this country at the rate of more than one 
for every hour of the day . . . .   
. . . The murder rate is 10,000 human lives a year, which is 
higher than the death rate in our current military operations in 
Vietnam which inspire such emotional and violent public 
demonstrations.58 
The judge wondered whether “a judicial system which consistently 
finds it necessary to try a criminal case 3, 4 or 5 times” deserves “the 
confidence and respect” of “decent people.”59 He looked admiringly at 
                                                     
53. Id. at 12. 
54. Id. at 23. 
55. Warren E. Burger, What to Do about Crime in U.S.: A Federal Judge Speaks, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP., Aug. 7, 1967, at 70. 
56. According to John Dean, future President Nixon sent Judge Burger a letter complimenting 
him on his U.S. News article. See JOHN W. DEAN, THE REHNQUIST CHOICE 12–13 (2001). John 
Ehrlichman, who served as an assistant to President Nixon, tells a somewhat different story: Shortly 
after his inauguration, President Nixon asked Judge Burger to come to the White House to 
administer the oath of office to some of the President’s new appointees. Judge Burger brought with 
him a copy of the speech that had been reprinted in U.S. News. After the President and Judge Burger 
had talked for a while, the President handed Ehrlichman a copy of the Burger speech and told him to 
disseminate it to various people (including Attorney General John Mitchell, who was in charge of 
Supreme Court appointments). The President also told Ehrlichman to “keep in touch with the 
Judge.” He did not have to do much to carry out the President’s orders, recalls Ehrlichman, 
“because Burger was a past master at keeping in touch.” From that point on, Ehrlichman received a 
number of notes from Burger about the Supreme Court, law enforcement, and other topics. See 
EHRLICHMAN, supra note 45, at 114. 
57. DEAN, supra note 56, at 13. 
58. Burger, supra note 55, at 70. 
59. Id. at 72. 
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“North Europe countries” such as Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and 
Holland, where “there is much less crime generally than in the United 
States.”60 
These “North Europe countries,” pointed out Burger, “do not consider 
it necessary to use a device like our Fifth Amendment under which an 
accused person may not be required to testify. They go swiftly, 
efficiently and directly to the question of whether the accused is 
guilty.”61 Compared to American criminal justice, noted Judge Burger, 
the Northern European countries’ “system of finding the facts 
concerning guilt or innocence is almost ruthless.”62 
V.  PRESIDENT NIXON NOMINATES WILLIAM REHNQUIST 
TO BE ASSOCIATE JUSTICE 
Warren Burger’s record as a federal Court of Appeals judge and as a 
speaker and writer left little doubt that as a Supreme Court justice he 
would read the Warren Court’s criminal procedure cases as grudgingly 
as possible. But when it came to “law and order” another Nixon 
appointee yielded to no one—William Rehnquist. 
Rehnquist was only in his new post as Assistant Attorney General in 
charge of the Office of Legal Counsel for a few months before he wrote 
a memorandum to John Dean (of Watergate fame) underscoring the need 
to re-examine such cases as Escobedo and Miranda.63 One can get a 
good sense of what the future Supreme Court Justice thought about the 
Warren Court’s criminal procedure rulings by studying this 
memorandum. 
“[T]here is reason to believe,” maintained Rehnquist, “that the 
Supreme Court has failed to hold true the balance between the right of 




63. See Memorandum from William H. Rehnquist, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal 
Counsel, to John W. Dean III, Assoc. Deputy Attorney Gen. (Apr. 1, 1969) [hereinafter Rehnquist 
Memorandum] (on file with the Washington Law Review). The memorandum was marked 
“administratively confidential.” According to Dean, this “kept it locked up for many years.” DEAN, 
supra note 56, at 268. I am indebted to Professor Thomas Y. Davies of the University of Tennessee 
College of Law for calling this memorandum to my attention and providing me with a copy (which 
he obtained from the National Archives). 
  Rehnquist’s proposal to establish a commission to determine whether some of the Warren Court 
rulings called for a constitutional amendment never went beyond Dean’s discussion of the issue 
with Attorney General John Mitchell. The Attorney General thought “it might create a problem if 
the Nixon administration could not control such a commission which would not be easy.” DEAN, 
supra note 56, at 269. 
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society to convict the guilty and the obligation of society to safeguard 
the accused.”64 Therefore, recommended Rehnquist, “the President 
[should] appoint a Commission to review these decisions, to determine 
whether the overriding public interest in law enforcement . . . requires a 
constitutional amendment.”65 
Although the Rehnquist memorandum voiced unhappiness with other 
matters (such as the search and seizure exclusionary rule and the sharp 
increase in habeas corpus petitions),66 it focused primarily on police 
interrogation and confessions: 
Limitations both drastic and novel have been placed on the 
use . . . of pre-trial statements of the defendant . . . .67 
. . . The Court is now committed to the proposition that relevant, 
competent, uncoerced statements of the defendant will not be 
admissible at his trial unless an elaborate set of warnings be 
given which is very likely to have the effect of preventing a 
defendant from making any statement at all.68 
Up to this point, Rehnquist’s criticism of Miranda was certainly 
debatable. But then he made a mistake. He recalled Justice Robert 
Jackson’s observation that “any lawyer worth his salt will tell the 
suspect in no uncertain terms to make no statement under any 
circumstances.”69 
By quoting Justice Jackson in the manner he did, Rehnquist badly 
smudged the distinction between two different rules: (a) the rule 
Miranda actually adopted, which only calls for the police to advise a 
custodial suspect he has a right to a lawyer, and only grants him the right 
to a lawyer if he asks for one, and (b) a rule which the Miranda Court 
plainly rejected—one requiring the police to make sure that a custodial 
suspect actually confers with a lawyer before he can be questioned.70 
The distinction between these two rules is quite significant. As 
Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist should have known, or a member 
                                                     
64. See Rehnquist Memorandum, supra note 63, at 2. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. at 1. 
68. Id. at 5. 
69. Id. (quoting from Justice Jackson’s opinion in Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949) 
(Jackson, J., concurring and dissenting)). 
70. See supra notes 24–27. In a way, Judge Friendly made the same mistake as future Justice 
Rehnquist did. But Friendly was anticipating what the Warren Court might do when it handed down 
Miranda. Rehnquist, on the other hand, was writing a memorandum about confessions 
approximately three years after the Miranda case had been decided. 
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of his staff should have informed him, only a year earlier a study of 
police interrogation in Washington, D.C. had revealed that the great 
majority of custodial suspects (a) sign waivers of their rights and (b) do 
not ask to see a lawyer.71 More recent studies are to the same effect.72 
VI.  CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER AND JUSTICE REHNQUIST 
ADMINISTER THE FIRST BLOWS TO MIRANDA: THE 
HARRIS AND TUCKER CASES 
I have dwelt on Burger and Rehnquist because (a) they were probably 
the two most “police-friendly” Justices in Supreme Court history and (b) 
each played a prominent role in the downsizing and dismantling of 
Miranda. Chief Justice Burger administered the first blow to Miranda in 
Harris v. New York.73 Justice Rehnquist delivered the second blow in 
Michigan v. Tucker.74 
A.  Harris v. New York 
In Harris, the police had obtained incriminating statements from the 
defendant in violation of Miranda. The question presented was whether 
the prosecution could impeach Mr. Harris’s credibility with these un-
Mirandized statements when he took the stand in his own defense. 
Writing for a 5-4 majority consisting of two Nixon appointees 
(Blackmun and himself) and the three Miranda dissenters still on the 
Court (Harlan, Stewart and White), the Chief Justice ruled that the 
prosecution could impeach the defendant. The majority relied heavily on 
Walder v. United States,75 which grew out of very different facts: Mr. 
Walder’s testimony had been impeached by means of illegally seized 
evidence relating to a different incident and one that had occurred two 
years before his prosecution in the case that ultimately reached the 
Supreme Court. 
Moreover, the Chief Justice failed to make clear that the prosecution 
was allowed to impeach Mr. Walder’s credibility only because when the 
defendant testified in his own defense he “went beyond a mere denial of 
                                                     
71. Richard J. Medalie, Leonard Zeitz & Paul Alexander, Custodial Police Interrogation in Our 
Nation’s Capital, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1347, 1351–52 (1968). 
72. See LEO, supra note 2, at 280–81; Mark A. Godsey, Reformulating the Miranda Warnings in 
Light of Contemporary Law and Understandings, 90 MINN. L. REV. 781, 792–93 (2006) (and 
authorities collected therein). 
73. 401 U.S. 222 (1971). 
74. 417 U.S. 433 (1974). 
75. 347 U.S. 62 (1954). 
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complicity in the crimes of which he was charged and made the 
sweeping claim that he had never dealt in or possessed any narcotics.”76 
Nor is that all. In Walder, the prosecution had impeached the 
defendant’s testimony as to collateral matters—not, as in Harris, with 
incriminating statements by the defendant bearing directly on the crime 
charged. As Professors Alan Dershowitz and John Hart Ely have pointed 
out, there is a significant difference between the two situations: “[T]here 
is a considerable risk that illegally obtained evidence which bears 
directly on the crime charged [as it did in Harris] will be considered by 
the jury as direct evidence of the defendant’s guilt. This risk is 
significantly reduced when the illegally obtained evidence does not 
directly relate to the elements of crime charged [as was true in 
Walder].”77 
Although the Harris majority relied heavily on Walder, it neglected to 
point out that Walder reminded us that “the Constitution guarantees a 
defendant the fullest opportunity to meet the accusation against him”78 
and that the defendant “must be free to deny all the elements of the case 
against him without thereby giving leave to the Government to [use] 
rebuttal evidence illegally secured by it.”79 
When Mr. Harris took the stand in his own defense he did nothing to 
waive his right to have the un-Mirandized statements excluded from his 
cross-examination just as the defendant in the 1925 case of Agnello v. 
United States80 had done nothing to waive his right to have the illegally 
seized evidence excluded. Although one would never know this from 
Chief Justice Burger’s majority opinion in Harris, if one reads Walder in 
its entirety (as opposed to the extracts from the case that the Chief 
Justice carefully selected) and one reads Agnello v. United States—
which the Chief Justice never once cited81—it becomes clear that 
Agnello represents the general principle and that “the [Walder] Court 
carved a narrow exception out of the Agnello principle.”82 
                                                     
76. Id. at 65 (emphasis added). 
77. Alan M. Dershowitz & John Hart Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on 
the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198, 1215–16 (1971) 
(emphasis added). 
78. Walder, 347 U.S. at 65. 
79. Id. (emphasis added). 
80. 269 U.S. 20 (1925). 
81. Not only did the Chief Justice neglect to cite Agnello even once, he “appears to have gone to 
some pains to excise from [his] rendition of Walder all reference to Agnello.” Dershowitz & Ely, 
supra note 77, at 1213. 
82. Stone, supra note 9, at 108. To the same effect is Dershowitz & Ely, supra note 77, at 1211. 
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Specific language in the Miranda opinion seemed to anticipate—and 
resolve—the fact situation in Harris: 
The privilege against self-incrimination protects the individual 
from being compelled to incriminate himself in any 
manner . . . . In fact, statements merely intended to be 
exculpatory by the defendant are often used to impeach his 
testimony at trial . . . . These statements are incriminating in any 
meaningful sense of the word and may not be used without the 
full warnings and effective waiver required for any other 
statement.83 
But the Harris Court brushed off this language by noting that 
discussion of the impeachment issue “was not at all necessary to the 
Court’s holding and cannot be regarded as controlling.”84 As Professor 
Stone has observed, however: 
[M]iranda was deliberately structured to canvass a wide range 
of problems, many of which were not directly raised by the 
cases before the Court. This approach was thought necessary in 
order to give “concrete guidelines for law enforcement agencies 
and courts to follow.” Thus, a technical reading of Miranda, 
such as that employed in Harris, would enable the Court to label 
many critical aspects of the decision mere dictum and therefore 
not “controlling.”85 
“To what extent,” asks Geoffrey Stone, “does the result in Harris 
provide an incentive to police not to warn a suspect of his rights, in 
violation of Miranda?”86 He answers: 
The incentive would seem substantial . . . . [I]f the suspect [does 
confess to the police without warnings and then] chooses to 
testify at trial, the confession can be used to impeach and, 
because of the ineffectiveness of limiting instructions, is likely 
to be used as substantive evidence of guilt as well. On the other 
hand, if the suspect attempts to avoid this dilemma by exercising 
                                                     
83. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476–77 (1966). Prior to Harris, most state and federal 
courts of appeals addressing this issue had ruled that un-Mirandized statements were inadmissible 
for impeachment purposes. See Stone, supra note 9, at 107. 
84. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224 (1971). 
85. See Stone, supra note 9, at 107–08. Chief Justice Warren spent fifty pages “discuss[ing] the 
relationship of the Fifth Amendment privilege to police interrogation,” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 491, 
before turning to the facts of the cases before the Court. Moreover, as pointed out in Dershowitz & 
Ely, supra note 77, at 1210, the opinion “said that it was part of its ‘holding’ that an uncounseled 
‘exculpatory’ statement could not be used by the prosecution” (emphasis added), referring to 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. 
86. Stone, supra note 9, at 112. 
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his right not to testify at trial, the jury is likely, despite 
cautionary instructions, to regard his silence as evidence of guilt. 
Thus, for the police, it is virtually a no-lose situation.87 
Finally, it should be noted that the Harris majority maintained that 
Mr. Harris had never “claim[ed] that the statements [he] made to the 
police were coerced or involuntary.”88 The best that can be said for this 
misstatement of the record by the Court is that it is inexplicable. One 
commentator put it more strongly: 
This statement . . . is flatly untrue. At his trial, throughout the 
state appellate proceedings, and in his brief and oral argument 
before the Supreme Court, Harris consistently maintained that 
his statements to the police were involuntary.89 
Cases subsequent to Harris make clear that the use of an 
“involuntary” or “coerced” statement for impeachment purposes is 
forbidden.90 Thus, because of the Court’s misunderstanding of the 
record, Mr. Harris was never able to show that the statements the police 
obtained from him should have been excluded from his cross-
examination. But this misunderstanding of the record is important for 
another reason. It underscores the sloppiness characterizing the majority 
opinion in Harris. How could the four Justices who joined the opinion of 
the Court in Harris have done so without noticing the Chief Justice’s 
mistake in discussing the record and without insisting that the record be 
corrected? Where were their law clerks? For that matter, how could the 
four Justices who joined the opinion of the Court in Harris have done so 
without noticing that the Chief Justice had mangled the state of the law 
                                                     
87. Id. The Harris majority maintained that “the impeachment process here undoubtedly provided 
valuable aid to the jury in assessing [the defendant’s] credibility, and the benefits of this process 
should not be lost . . . because of the speculative possibility that impermissible police conduct will 
be encouraged thereby.” Harris, 401 U.S. at 225 (emphasis added). It is possible the police might 
not have decided on their own to exploit the opening that Harris afforded them. But in 1998 
Professor Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109 (1998), reported that 
litigation seeking to stop the California police from questioning custodial suspects after they had 
asserted their Miranda rights had turned up a California police training videotape in which a 
California deputy district attorney was instructing police officers to continue to question suspects 
who had invoked their rights (a tactic known as questioning “outside Miranda”): 
[I]f you get a statement “outside Miranda” and [the suspect] tells you that he did it and how he 
did it . . . we can use [that] to impeach [him] . . . . [I]f the defendant . . . gets on the stand and 
lies and says something different, we can use his “outside Miranda” statements to impeach 
him . . . .  
Id. at 191. 
88. Harris, 401 U.S. at 224. 
89. Stone, supra note 9, at 114; see also Dershowitz & Ely, supra note 77, at 1201–08. 
90. See New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (1979); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978). 
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governing the impeachment use of statements inadmissible in the 
prosecution’s case-in-chief? 
Harris v. New York was an important decision in its own right. 
Moreover, it was the first of a series of blows the post-Warren Court 
dealt Miranda. But in announcing the decision, Chief Justice Burger did 
his best to minimize the case’s significance. 
The Washington Post reported that when he announced the decision, 
Burger called it “a matter ‘of interest mostly to the bar’” and “not worth 
describing from the bench.”91 The Los Angeles Times told its readers that 
“[a]nnouncing the ruling, Burger seemed to minimize its significance by 
not describing the case, only the vote breakdown.”92 The Chicago 
Tribune noted that that “[c]ontrary to custom, the chief justice declined 
to read highlights of his opinion from the bench.”93 
Harris marked the beginning of the post-Warren Court’s piece-by-
piece “overruling” of Miranda. But Harris did something else. It began 
what recently has been called the “stealth overruling” of Miranda.94 
B.  Michigan v. Tucker 
When the Warren Court’s “revolution” in American criminal 
procedure was at its height, Judge Henry Friendly complained about the 
effect of “hard cases”—“the full consequences of decision may have 
been clouded by understandable outrage over the facts at hand.”95 Judge 
Friendly had in mind such cases as Mapp v. Ohio,96 Fay v. Noia,97 and 
Escobedo v. Illinois,98 cases whose extreme facts favored the 
defendant.99 But sometimes a case is a “hard case” because its facts are 
tilted heavily in favor of the prosecution. Michigan v. Tucker is such a 
case. 
Mr. Tucker had been advised of his right to remain silent and his right 
                                                     
91. John P. MacKenzie, Court Eases Restraint on Confessions, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 1971, at 
A1. 
92. Ronald J. Ostrow, Court Limits Effect of the Miranda Decision on Defendant’s Rights, L.A. 
TIMES, Feb. 25, 1971, at 21. 
93. Glen Elsasser, Ease Warren Curb on Police Quizzing, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 25, 1971, at 1. 
94. Friedman, supra note 2 (emphasis added). 
95. HENRY J. FRIENDLY, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, in BENCHMARKS 
235, 236 (1967). The text of this chapter was taken from Judge Friendly’s speech to the State Bar of 
California on Sept. 23, 1965. Id. 
96. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
97. 372 U.S. 391 (1963). 
98. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). 
99. See FRIENDLY, supra note 95, at 264 n.135. 
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to counsel, but not of his right to the appointment of counsel if he were 
indigent. The police questioning had occurred before the Miranda case 
had been decided. Moreover, the defendant’s only complaint was that 
the testimony of a witness for the prosecution should have been 
excluded because the police had learned of the witness’s identity solely 
as a result of the defendant’s un-Mirandized statements. 
Concurring Justice Brennan would have resolved the matter in favor 
of the prosecution by “confin[ing] the reach of Johnson v. New Jersey to 
those cases in which the direct statements of an accused made during a 
pre-Miranda interrogation were introduced at his post-Miranda trial.”100 
But the Court (per Justice Rehnquist) rejected this approach. 
Justice Rehnquist emphasized how narrow the question presented 
was: The incriminating statements the defendant had “actually made” to 
the police had been excluded at trial.101 “Whatever deterrent effect on 
future police conduct the exclusion of those statements may have had, 
we do not believe it would be significantly augmented by excluding the 
testimony of the witness . . . as well.”102 
Some of the comments made by Justice Rehnquist in the course of his 
majority opinion are puzzling. 
At one point he noted that “[c]ertainly no one could contend that the 
interrogation faced by [the defendant] bore any resemblance to the 
historical practices at which the right against compulsory self-
incrimination was aimed.”103 This may be true, but why is Justice 
Rehnquist telling us this? Certainly no one would contend that the police 
interrogation experienced by Mr. Miranda or the defendants in 
Miranda’s three companion cases resembled the historical practices at 
which the Self-Incrimination Clause was aimed. For that matter, no one 
would say that comment by the prosecution on a defendant’s failure to 
take the stand or an instruction by the trial court that a defendant’s 
silence is evidence of guilt—both prohibited by Griffin v. California104—
resembled the historical circumstances underlying the privilege. 
At another place in his opinion, Justice Rehnquist observed that Mr. 
Tucker’s statements to the police “could hardly be termed involuntary as 
that term has been defined in the decisions of this Court.”105 Once again, 
                                                     
100. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 458 (1974) (Brennan, J., concurring, joined by Marshall, 
J.). For a discussion of Johnson, see supra notes 28–31. 
101. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 448. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. at 444. 
104. 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 
105. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 445. 
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this may be true, but what is its relevance? Mr. Miranda’s statements and 
the statements of the defendants in Miranda’s three companion cases 
could hardly be called “involuntary” as that term had been defined by 
the Supreme Court in the pre-Miranda era. Nevertheless, they all 
prevailed in the Supreme Court. Moreover, all four defendants probably 
would have lost if they had been required to establish that their 
incriminating statements were “coerced” or “involuntary.” 
At still another point, Justice Rehnquist seemed to equate (a) 
“compulsion” within the meaning of the privilege against self-
incrimination and (b) “coercion” under the “voluntariness” test.106 This, 
too, is puzzling. To be sure, “compulsion” and “coercion” have similar 
meanings when one turns to the dictionary. But they have distinctly 
different connotations when one takes into account their different 
constitutional bases, legal history, and legal meaning. 
As Victor Earle, a lawyer for a defendant in a companion case to 
Miranda, emphasized in an exchange with Justice Harlan, much greater 
pressures were necessary to render a confession “coerced” or 
“involuntary” under the “voluntariness” test than are needed to make a 
statement “compelled” within the meaning of the privilege.107 
When asked by Justice Harlan whether he was contending that his 
client’s statement was “coerced,” Mr. Earle replied that he did not think 
the confession in his case was coerced “at all.”108 Nevertheless, Earle 
expected to win his case—and he did. Perhaps Justice Harlan 
remembered his exchange with Mr. Earle. In any event, in his dissenting 
opinion in Miranda, Harlan recognized that “the privilege imposes more 
exacting restrictions than does the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
voluntariness test.”109 
                                                     
106. See id. at 444–46. According to Justice Rehnquist, the police conduct in Tucker violated 
neither a defendant’s “privilege against self-incrimination as such” (as opposed to the “procedural 
safeguards associated with that right”) nor the protection against “involuntary” confessions. See id. 
at 444–45. 
107. This part of the oral arguments in Miranda and its companion cases is reprinted in YALE 
KAMISAR, WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES, COMMENTS & 
QUESTIONS 569–70 (13th ed. 2012): 
I don’t think [the confession in my case] was coerced at all. . . . I think there is a substantial 
difference between [compelling someone to give up his Fifth Amendment privilege] and 
coercing a confession. . . . [I]t is quite different to say that the privilege is cut down and 
impaired by detention and to say a man’s will has been so overborne a confession is forced 
from him. . . . 
. . . [I]f we go back to the totality of circumstances [test], that means this Court will sit all by 
itself as it has [for] so many years to overturn the few confessions it can take . . . The lower 
courts won’t do their job. We need some specific guidelines . . . to help them along the way. 
108. See id. 
109. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 511 (Harlan, J., dissenting, joined by Stewart and White, JJ.). 
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It is hard to see how reading Miranda to say that the privilege is not 
violated unless and until the pressures on the custodial suspect are strong 
enough to render any statement obtained from him “coerced” under the 
“voluntariness” test would make any sense. We already had a rule 
barring the use of “coerced” or “involuntary” confessions (or 
incriminating statements). If Miranda were to be read the way Justice 
Rehnquist indicated, what would it have accomplished? It is no 
exaggeration to say, as Geoffrey Stone has said: 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist’s conclusion that there is a violation of 
the Self-Incrimination Clause only if a statement is involuntary 
under traditional standards is an outright rejection of the core 
premises of Miranda . . . . [T]he conclusion that a violation of 
Miranda is not a violation of the privilege is flatly inconsistent 
with the Court’s declaration in Miranda that “[t]he requirement 
of warnings and waiver of rights is a fundamental with respect 
to the Fifth Amendment privilege.”110 
In some ways the most puzzling aspect of Justice Rehnquist’s opinion 
was his effort to drive a wedge between the privilege against self-
incrimination and the Miranda rights. At various places in his opinion, 
Rehnquist called the Miranda warnings “prophylactic rules,” 
“prophylactic standards,” “procedural safeguards,” and “procedural 
rules.”111 Does this make the Miranda rights “second-class rights” (if 
they are constitutional rights at all)? At other places Rehnquist called 
these rights “protective guidelines” and “recommended ‘procedural 
safeguards.’”112 Does this mean they are “third-class” rights? 
Not only did Justice Rehnquist indicate that the Miranda rights were 
not required, but he told us that the Warren Court itself had “recognized” 
as much: 
The [Miranda] Court recognized that these procedural 
safeguards [the Miranda rules] were not themselves rights 
protected by the Constitution but were instead measures to 
insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination was 
protected. As the Court remarked: “[W]e cannot say that the 
Constitution necessarily requires adherence to any particular 
solution for the inherent compulsions of the interrogation 
process as it is presently conducted.”113 
                                                     
110. Stone, supra note 9, at 118–19 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476). 
111. See Tucker, 417 U.S. at 439, 443–46. 
112. Id. at 443 (emphasis added). 
113. Id. at 444 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467). 
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Justice Rehnquist’s quotation from Miranda is incomplete—and quite 
misleading. Once Miranda was decided, the police could no longer 
conduct the proceedings in the interrogation room the way they did in 
the so-called “good old days.” Some new safeguards were 
constitutionally required. Because “[t]he current practice of 
incommunicado interrogation is at odds with” the privilege against self-
incrimination,114 the police could not stand pat. 
Requiring all custodial interrogations to occur in the presence of a 
neutral judicial magistrate might sufficiently reduce the “inherently 
compelling pressures [of in-custody interrogation] which work to 
undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak 
where he would not otherwise do so freely.”115 A requirement that the 
police videotape all custodial interrogation might prove to be an 
“adequate protective device . . . to dispel the compulsion inherent in 
custodial surroundings.”116 
However, in the absence of any other protective device—and, as 
dissenting Justice Douglas noted in Tucker, there was no contention that 
any other means for safeguarding the privilege was in place117—the 
Miranda warnings were required. 
Justice Rehnquist did quote language from Miranda in Tucker, but he 
ended his quotations too soon. In the very same paragraph from Miranda 
that Rehnquist quoted, Chief Justice Warren went on to say: 
However, unless we are shown other procedures which are at 
least as effective in apprising accused persons of their right of 
silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it, 
the following safeguards [the Miranda warnings] must be 
observed.118 
As Geoffrey Stone has pointed out: 
As even [Rehnquist] conceded, [the Miranda Court] thought that 
the privilege against self-incrimination offered “a more 
comprehensive and less subjective protection”119 than the Due 
Process Clause which had been the basis of the traditional 
voluntariness test . . . . [Justice Rehnquist’s] conclusion that a 
violation of Miranda is not a violation of the privilege is flatly 
                                                     
114. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457. 
115. Id. at 467. 
116. Id. at 458. 
117. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 463. 
118. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467. 
119. Stone, supra note 9, at 118–19 (quoting Tucker, 417 U.S. at 442–43). 
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inconsistent with the Court’s declaration in Miranda that “[t]he 
requirement of warnings and waiver of rights is a fundamental 
with respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege.”120 . . . If [the 
Miranda] safeguards are not derived from the Constitution, 
whence do they spring? . . . Since the Court has no supervisory 
power over the states, the Rehnquist analysis, if taken seriously, 
would seem in practical effect to overrule Miranda.121 
Three decades later, the Court finally directed its attention to the 
federal statute purporting to abolish Miranda. As it turned out, not even 
Chief Justice Rehnquist took the Rehnquist analysis in Tucker seriously. 
He wrote the opinion of the Court for a 7-2 majority invalidating the 
statute.122 
However, as far as Miranda supporters were concerned, Rehnquist’s 
analysis of Miranda in Tucker, and his failure in Dickerson to question 
the soundness of cases that built on Tucker, did do considerable damage: 
earlier cases had downsized Miranda on the premise that a violation of 
Miranda is not a violation of a constitutional right, but only a 
“prophylactic rule” designed to implement a constitutional right.123 
Although these earlier cases seemed to be based on the view that 
Miranda was not a constitutional decision, their significance has not 
been diminished one whit. Despite the invalidation of the federal statute, 
the downsizing of Miranda brought about by these earlier cases remains 
in place today.124 
Although one would never have known this from Justice Rehnquist’s 
discussion of (and quotations from) Miranda in his Tucker opinion, not 
once in his sixty-page opinion of the Court did Chief Justice Warren call 
the Miranda rights prophylactic rules or procedural safeguards. What is 
probably more significant, not once did any of the Miranda dissenters 
complain that the majority opinion represented an “extraconstitutional” 
or “illegitimate” exercise of the Supreme Court’s authority to review 
state-court judgments.125 
                                                     
120. Id. at 119 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476). 
121. Id. at 119–20. 
122. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
123. See especially Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) (Justice O’Connor writing for the 
majority); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (Justice Rehnquist writing for the majority). 
124. See infra notes 210–27. 
125. At this point, I am borrowing language from Justice Scalia, who wrote a forceful dissent in 
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 528 (2000), the case that reaffirmed the constitutionality of 
Miranda. Id. at 461, 465 (Scalia, J., dissenting). At two places in his Miranda dissenting opinion, 
Justice White did refer to the majority’s “per se approach” or use of “per se rule,” Miranda, 384 
U.S. at 539, 544 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Harlan and Stewart, JJ.), but he did not suggest 
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Although Justice Rehnquist’s way of thinking about Miranda in his 
Tucker opinion finds little support in either the majority or dissenting 
opinions in Miranda itself, a 1969 Department of Justice (DOJ) 
memorandum126 (written when Rehnquist headed the Office of Legal 
Counsel) is another matter. 
In an effort to defend the constitutionality of § 3501 (the federal law 
purporting to abolish Miranda),127 the 1969 DOJ memorandum drew a 
distinction between (a) “constitutional absolutes,” such as the privilege 
against self-incrimination,128 and (b) what the memorandum called “a 
means, suggested by the Court, by which the accused’s Fifth 
Amendment privilege may be safeguarded in the custodial situation”129 
or “a protective safeguard system suggested by the Court.”130 
There does not seem to be much distance between the way Justice 
Rehnquist analyzed Miranda in Tucker and how the Justice Department 
viewed Miranda in its 1969 memorandum: The DOJ distinguished 
“constitutional absolutes” from mere “procedural safeguards.”131 
Rehnquist distinguished the “right against compulsory self-
incrimination” itself (which cannot be violated) from “prophylactic rules 
developed to protect that right”132 (which can be violated under certain 
                                                     
this was “extraconstitutional” or “illegitimate.” 
  Justice White’s characterization of the Miranda rights as per se rules is interesting. As one 
commentator has observed, the kind of decision-making the Warren Court utilized did lead it to turn 
to “broad, legislative-like directives, sometimes called ‘flat’ or ‘per se’ rules.” Allen, supra note 43, 
at 532. The main advantages of such rules are that they “give relatively certain guidance to the 
lower courts” and “are applicable to a great mass of cases at the trial court levels without direct 
involvement of the Supreme Court.” Id. As Justice White’s dissenting opinion in Miranda 
illustrates, the Justices do not always distinguish between “prophylactic” rules and what are 
variously called “flat” or “bright-line” or “administratively based per se rules.” But 1 WAYNE R. 
LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 2.9(g), 2.9(h) (3d ed. 2007) does distinguish between 
these two types of rules: 
Where rules are described as “prophylactic,” the Court indicates its willingness to accept 
equally effective safeguards adopted by the state or federal government. . . . When rules are 
described as setting forth a “per se” or “bright line” standard, they arguably are presented as a 
direct reading of the constitutional command at issue and not a standard that the state can 
replace with an adequate alternative . . . . 
Id. § 2.9(h) at 806 n.214. 
126. Memorandum from the Department of Justice to United States Attorneys (June 11, 1969), in 
5 CRIMINAL LAW REPORTER 2350 (Bureau of Nat’l Affairs ed. 1969) [hereinafter Memorandum to 
U.S. Attorneys]. 
127. See supra notes 34–41. 
128. Memorandum to U.S. Attorneys, supra note 126, at 2351–52. 
129. Id. at 2351. 
130. Id. at 2352. 
131. Id. at 2351–52. 
132. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 439 (1974). 
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circumstances). The DOJ talks about “a protective safeguard system 
suggested by the Court”133 and Rehnquist speaks of “procedural 
safeguards” “recommended” by the Miranda Court.134 
What role, if any, did then-Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist play 
in the writing of the 1969 Justice memorandum? We do not know. But it 
is hard to believe that Rehnquist played no role at all. 
At the time the DOJ memorandum was written, Rehnquist headed the 
Office of Legal Counsel, and it was not unusual for that office to write 
(or at least contribute to the writing) of such memoranda. Nor is that all. 
Rehnquist was so unhappy with Miranda that only two months earlier he 
had written a memorandum to John Dean proposing a way to get rid of 
that famous case.135 Moreover, Attorney General John Mitchell knew 
how strongly Rehnquist felt about Miranda because, as Mr. Dean has 
told us,136 Dean and Mitchell had met to discuss whether or not to carry 
out Rehnquist’s proposal. 
There is another reason to believe that future Justice Rehnquist 
contributed to the writing of the DOJ memorandum. As John Dean 
recently told me, because the memorandum was addressed to all U.S. 
Attorneys and Deputy Attorney General Richard Kleindienst was the 
person who supervised these attorneys at the time, “[the] memo would 
have been prepared with the approval of Kleindienst.”137 “[G]iven the 
close relationship between Kleindienst and Rehnquist, it would be very 
surprising if Rehnquist was not behind this action. It was Kleindienst, of 
course, who brought Rehnquist into the DOJ, and who relied on him 
heavily.”138 
VII.  “PROPHYLACTIC RULES” VS. CONSTITUTIONAL RULES 
Miranda was not the only time the Court dealt with “prophylactic 
rules.” The Court also promulgated such rules in a line of cases 
beginning with North Carolina v. Pearce.139 Pearce arose as follows: a 
number of defendants had overturned their original convictions only to 
receive longer sentences when they were retried and reconvicted. There 
                                                     
133. Memorandum to U.S. Attorneys, supra note 126, at 2352 (emphasis added). 
134. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 443 (emphasis added). 
135. See supra notes 63–70. 
136. See supra note 63. 
137. E-mail from John Dean, former Assoc. Deputy Attorney Gen., to author (Sept. 20, 2011) (on 
file with author). 
138. Id. 
139. 395 U.S. 711 (1969). 
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was reason to believe that in some instances at least these defendants 
were being punished for managing to overturn their earlier convictions. 
But it would be “extremely difficult” to prove this in any individual 
case.140 
What was the Pearce Court’s solution? Establishing what has come to 
be known as a “presumption of vindictiveness:”141 “[W]henever a judge 
imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after a new trial, the 
reasons for his doing so must affirmatively appear . . . [and] must be 
based upon objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the 
part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentence 
proceeding.”142 
Several years later, the Court had become so comfortable with 
Miranda’s prophylactic rules that a 7-2 majority explained and defended 
“the Pearce prophylactic rules” by analogizing them to the Miranda 
rules: 
[T]he Pearce prophylactic rules assist in guaranteeing the 
propriety of the sentencing phase of the criminal process. In this 
protective role, Pearce is analogous to Miranda, . . . in which 
the Court established rules to govern police practices during 
custodial interrogations in order to safeguard the rights of the 
accused and to assure the reliability of statements made during 
these interrogations. Thus, the prophylactic rules in Pearce and 
Miranda are similar in that each was designed to preserve the 
integrity of a phase of the criminal process.143 
As Susan Klein has persuasively argued, constitutional-criminal 
procedure is filled with what might be called “prophylactic rules.”144 Nor 
are these rules limited to criminal procedure. As David Strauss has 
shown, the famous case of New York Times v. Sullivan145 (and other First 
Amendment cases) may plausibly be read as adopting prophylactic rules 
as well.146 
                                                     
140. Id. at 725 n.20. 
141. CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 881 (5th ed. 
2008). 
142. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726. 
143. Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 53 (1973) (per Powell, J.). The 7-2 majority included Chief 
Justice Burger and future Chief Justice Rehnquist. 
144. Susan R. Klein, Identifying and (Re)Formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe Harbors, and 
Incidental Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1030 (2001). 
145. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
146. David A. Strauss, Miranda, the Constitution, and Congress, 99 MICH. L. REV. 958, 965–66 
(2001). 
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As for the characterization of Miranda as a prophylactic rule that 
“goes beyond” the Constitution: 
[This notion] seems to rest on the premise that a case-by-case 
inquiry into voluntariness is somehow natural, or is found in the 
Constitution, so that any deviation from that approach is judicial 
lawmaking of questionable legitimacy. But the Constitution does 
not ordain any particular institutional mechanism for ensuring 
that compelled statements are not admitted into evidence. The 
case-by-case voluntariness approach is just one such 
mechanism. The Supreme Court has to decide if it is the right 
mechanism.147 
If one calls the Miranda rules “prophylactic,” notes Evan Caminker, 
“one might fairly ask: compared to what? The obvious answer is 
‘compared to the case-specific-voluntariness test.’”148 But that test is no 
more “directly compelled” by the Constitution than Miranda itself.149 
The due process/“totality of the circumstances”/“voluntariness” test 
for the admissibility of confessions cannot be called a requirement of the 
Self-Incrimination Clause, because that Clause did not apply to the states 
until 1964150—long after the Supreme Court had started using the test. 
Moreover, the Self-Incrimination Clause did not apply to the police 
station until Miranda was handed down in 1966. Finally, one will search 
the Constitution in vain for any mention of any of the key words or 
terms used to decide “voluntariness” cases—such as “coerced,” 
“involuntary,” “totality of the circumstances,” and “breaking” or 
“overbearing” the will. So why is the prohibition against “involuntary” 
confessions (as opposed to the protection furnished by Miranda) 
considered a “core constitutional right?” 
I believe there is a good deal to be said for Dean Caminker’s proposal 
that “we jettison the phrase ‘prophylactic rule’ from our vocabulary, 
because there really isn’t any such thing as a distinctively prophylactic 
rule that is in any important way distinguishable from the more run-of-
the-mill doctrine that courts routinely establish and implement regarding 
every constitutional norm.”151 Moreover, “to the extent one purports to 
use the adjective pejoratively, it inappropriately raises concerns of 
                                                     
147. Id. at 963. 
148. Evan H. Caminker, Miranda and Some Puzzles of “Prophylactic” Rules, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 
1, 26 (2001). 
149. Id. 
150. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
151. Caminker, supra note 148, at 25. 
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legitimacy where none should exist.”152 
However, as long as “prophylactic rule” does remain part of our 
vocabulary, it is noteworthy that in Edwards v. Arizona,153 a majority of 
the Burger Court essentially established a new “prophylactic rule” that 
built on Miranda’s “prophylactic rules.” Edwards held that when a 
custodial suspect invokes his right to a lawyer, he may not be subjected 
to further interrogation until counsel has been made available to him—
unless he himself initiates further discussion with the police. Edwards 
held, in effect, that when a custodial suspect asserts his right to counsel, 
there is a conclusive presumption that any subsequent waiver of rights 
that comes at police instigation is compelled.154 
Nor is that all. A decade later, in Minnick v. Mississippi,155 a majority 
of the Rehnquist Court—over a strong protest by dissenting Justice 
Scalia that this “is the latest stage of prophylaxis built upon 
prophylaxis”156—expanded the Edwards rule still further. The Court 
held that “when counsel is requested, interrogation must cease and 
officials may not reinstate interrogation without counsel present, 
whether or not the accused has consulted with his attorney”157 in the 
meantime. Speaking for a 7-2 majority, Justice Kennedy observed: 
[The Edwards rule] ensures that any statement made [by a 
suspect who has previously asserted his right to counsel] is not 
the result of coercive pressures. Edwards conserves judicial 
resources which would otherwise be expended in making 
difficult determinations of voluntariness, and implements the 
protections of Miranda in practical and straightforward 
terms. . . . [The] rule provides “clear and unequivocal” 
guidelines to the law enforcement profession.158 
This explanation and defense of Edwards strikes me as an explanation 
and defense of Miranda as well. 
                                                     
152. Id. 
153. 451 U.S. 477 (1981). Edwards is one of the few times in the last forty years that the 
Supreme Court gave Miranda a generous reading. 
154. It will not do to say that Miranda required the Edwards rule. The Court had held earlier that 
if a suspect asserts his “right to silence” (as opposed to his right to counsel) the police are permitted 
(if they cease questioning on the spot) to try again and succeed at a subsequent interrogation. See 
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975). The Court could have plausibly held that invocation of the 
right to counsel should be treated no differently than the assertion of the right to silence. 
155. 498 U.S. 146 (1990) (per Kennedy, J.). 
156. Id. at 166 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J.). 
157. Id. at 153 (emphasis added). 
158. Id. at 151. Only Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissented. 
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VIII. THE COURT WEAKENS THE EDWARDS RULE 
The Supreme Court giveth, but the Supreme Court also taketh away. 
Although Edwards marked a significant victory for Miranda, and the 
Court went on to strengthen Edwards in some respects, it also weakened 
it in other ways. A good example is Oregon v. Bradshaw.159 
The police believed that Mr. Bradshaw’s drinking had brought about 
the death of a minor. After being arrested, Bradshaw invoked his right to 
counsel. A few moments later, while being taken to the jail, Bradshaw 
asked the accompanying officer: “Well, what is going to happen to me 
now?” 
This question led to a discussion about the minor’s death, during 
which time the officer reiterated his own theory of how Bradshaw’s 
drinking had caused this. The officer then persuaded the suspect to agree 
to take a lie detector test the next day, at which time the suspect 
confessed.160 
Writing for a four-Justice plurality,161 Justice Rehnquist maintained 
that the suspect’s question as to what was going to happen to him next 
evinced “a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about 
the investigation.”162 This conclusion appears to be quite a stretch. It 
seems much more likely that, as the four dissenters argued,163 Bradshaw 
was simply manifesting anxiety and that his only desire was to find out 
where the police were taking him next or what was going to happen to 
him next. 
Even though a suspect clearly invokes his or her right to counsel, the 
police still have some room to maneuver. When the officer responds to a 
suspect’s specific question about what is going to happen next, by telling 
the suspect where he is being taken, or when he will be meeting with an 
attorney or phoning his or her spouse, this should not count as “police 
interrogation.” But when the officer’s response goes beyond the scope of 
the suspect’s question—when the officer exploits the situation as seems 
to have occurred in Bradshaw—that should count as “police 
interrogation,” conduct barred by Edwards. 
Under such circumstances, the suspect did not change his or her mind 
about wanting to talk to a lawyer. The police did. The suspect did not 
                                                     
159. 462 U.S. 1039 (1983). 
160. Id. at 1042. 
161. Concurring Justice Powell provided the fifth vote. He agreed that Bradshaw had effectively 
waived his right to counsel, but saw no need for the plurality’s two-step analysis. 
162. See Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1045–46. 
163. See id. at 1055–56. 
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“initiate” or “invite” conversation about the strengths or weaknesses of 
his case. The police did. Therefore, the police conduct should be viewed 
as “police interrogation”—prohibited by Edwards. 
A decade later, the Court weakened the Edwards rule in another 
respect. In Davis v. United States,164 it tried to draw a bright line 
between those suspects who “clearly” assert their right to counsel 
(thereby gaining the protection of Edwards) and those who only make an 
ambiguous or equivocal reference to an attorney that might (or might 
not) be considered an invocation of the right to counsel. (E.g., “I think 
maybe I should ask for a lawyer at this point, don’t you?” or “Maybe the 
time has come for me to ask for a lawyer?” or “Do you think I need an 
attorney here?”) 
As Janet Ainsworth pointed out, a year before the Davis case was 
decided, women and members of a number of minority racial and ethnic 
groups are far more likely than other groups to avoid strong, assertive 
means of expression and to use indirect and hedged speech patterns that 
give the impression of uncertainty or equivocality.165 Unfortunately, 
however, in determining whether suspects have effectively invoked the 
right to counsel, a majority of the lower courts have acted on the premise 
that “direct and assertive speech . . . is, or should be, the norm.”166 
Moreover, since the custodial police interrogation environment involves 
an “imbalance of power” between suspects and their interrogators, such 
an environment increases the likelihood that a suspect will adopt an 
indirect or hedged—and thus ambiguous—means of expression.167 
More recently, after studying state and federal cases for twelve years, 
Marcy Strauss reported that only one out of five suspects’ statements 
were found to constitute unambiguous requests for counsel.168 Professor 
Strauss found “the use of questions, hedges and imprecise language in 
the custodial interrogation setting . . . very common among all 
suspects.”169 As for police interrogators, they not only “ignore 
ambiguous requests,” but “frequently use them to subtly or overtly 
encourage suspects to waive their right to counsel.”170 
                                                     
164. 512 U.S. 452 (1994). 
165. Janet E. Ainsworth, In a Different Register: The Pragmatics of Powerlessness in Police 
Interrogation, 103 YALE L.J. 259 (1993). 
166. Id. at 315. 
167. See id. at 285–88. 
168. Marcy Strauss, Understanding Davis v. United States, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1011, 1047, 
1055 (2007). 
169. Id. at 1057. 
170. Id. at 1060. 
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IX.  THE COURT DISPARAGES MIRANDA: QUARLES AND 
ELSTAD 
To many supporters of Miranda, however, how grudgingly the Court 
construed Edwards was not as disturbing as how unwilling the Court 
was to treat Miranda as a constitutional doctrine. A good example is 
New York v. Quarles.171 
Writing for a 5-4 majority, Rehnquist contrasted Miranda with 
“traditional due process standards.”172 Under the circumstances, he told 
us, the suspect could not invoke Miranda—but he was “certainly free on 
remand” to rely on the voluntariness test.173 
Quarles grew out of the following facts: shortly after midnight, the 
police apprehended defendant in the rear of a supermarket. He matched 
the description of a man who had just committed a rape. According to 
the victim, the man had been carrying a gun. When the police discovered 
the suspected rapist was wearing an empty shoulder holster, they asked 
him where his gun was and he pointed to some cartons (where the 
weapon was found). 
The questions about the gun’s location were not preceded by any 
warnings.174 The Court told us, however, that that did not matter. 
Because “public safety” was at stake, the police were justified in failing 
to advise the defendant of his Miranda rights.175 
Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist seemed to take 
considerable pains to avoid calling Miranda a constitutional ruling or a 
doctrine required by the Constitution. At one point, he referred to the 
Miranda warnings as “the procedural safeguards associated with the 
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination since Miranda;”176 at 
another place he called Miranda “the prophylactic rule protecting the 
Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination.”177 
A year after the Quarles case came Oregon v. Elstad.178 Mr. Elstad 
was suspected of burglary. When questioned at his own home, a police 
officer failed to advise him of his rights. Elstad then made an 
incriminating statement. (The prosecution subsequently conceded that 
                                                     
171. 467 U.S. 649 (1984). 
172. Id. at 655 n.5. 
173. Id. 
174. See id. at 652–53. 
175. See id. at 655–60. 
176. Id. at 655. 
177. Id. at 657. 
178. 470 U.S. 298 (1985). 
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this statement was inadmissible.)179 
When brought to the police station, Mr. Elstad was advised of his 
rights. He waived them and signed a written confession.180 Since his 
incriminating statement had been excluded by the trial court, the only 
question presented was whether the written confession itself was 
admissible. Mr. Elstad maintained that the written confession was fatally 
“tainted” by the statement the police had obtained from him before he 
arrived at the stationhouse. A 7-2 majority, per Justice O’Connor, 
disagreed. 
Justice O’Connor’s opinion for the Court, which relies heavily on 
Justice Rehnquist’s opinions in Tucker181 and Quarles, is quite 
remarkable—especially when one looks back at her opinion today. 
Fifteen years later, in the Dickerson case,182 Justice O’Connor would 
join a 7-2 majority opinion, one telling us that “Miranda, being a 
constitutional decision of this Court, may not be in effect overruled by 
an Act of Congress.”183 In the 1985 Elstad case, however (writing for 
another 7-2 majority), Justice O’Connor made at least nine statements to 
the effect that the Miranda doctrine (unlike the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule or exclusion stemming from a violation of the Fifth 
Amendment itself) is neither a “constitutional decision” nor a violation 
of any specific provision of the Constitution: 
(1) “[Metaphors, such as the ‘tainted fruit of the poisonous tree’] 
should not be used to obscure fundamental differences 
between the role of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary 
rule and the function of Miranda . . . .”184 
(2) “The Oregon court assumed and respondent here contends that a 
failure to administer Miranda warnings necessarily breeds the 
same consequences as police infringement of a constitutional 
right . . . . We believe this view misconstrues the nature of the 
protections afforded by Miranda warnings and therefore 
misreads the consequences of police failure to supply them.”185 
(3) “Respondent’s contention that his confession was tainted by the 
earlier failure of the police to provide Miranda warnings and 
                                                     
179. Id. at 300–02. 
180. Id. at 301–02. 
181. See supra notes 101–22. 
182. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
183. Id. at 432. 
184. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 304 (emphasis added). 
185. Id. (emphasis added). 
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must be excluded as ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ assumes the 
existence of a constitutional violation. . . . But as we explained 
in [earlier cases], a procedural Miranda violation differs in 
significant respects from violations of the Fourth Amendment, 
which have traditionally mandated a broad application of the 
‘fruits’ doctrine.”186 
(4) “The Miranda exclusionary rule . . . serves the Fifth Amendment 
and sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself. It 
may be triggered even in the absence of a Fifth Amendment 
violation.”187 
(5) “[U]nwarned statements that are otherwise voluntary within the 
meaning of the Fifth Amendment must nevertheless be excluded 
from evidence under Miranda. Thus, in the individual case, 
Miranda’s preventive medicine provides a remedy even to the 
defendant who has suffered no identifiable constitutional 
harm.”188 
(6) “[T]he Miranda presumption [of coercion] . . . does not require 
that the statements and their fruits be discarded as inherently 
tainted. . . . [T]he Tucker Court noted that neither the general 
goal of deterring improper police conduct nor the Fifth 
Amendment goal of assuring trustworthy evidence would be 
served by suppression of the witness’ testimony. . . . We believe 
that this reasoning applies with equal force when the alleged 
‘fruit’ of a noncoercive Miranda violation is neither a witness 
nor an article of evidence but the accused’s own voluntary 
testimony. As in Tucker, the absence of any coercion or 
improper tactics undercuts the twin rationales—trustworthiness 
and deterrence—for a broader rule.”189 
(7) “If errors are made by law enforcement officers in administering 
the prophylactic Miranda procedures, they should not breed the 
same irremediable consequences as police infringement of the 
Fifth Amendment itself.”190 
(8) “There is a vast difference between the direct consequences 
flowing from coercion of a confession by physical violence or 
other deliberate means calculated to break the suspect’s will and 
                                                     
186. Id. at 305–06 (emphasis added). 
187. Id. at 306 (emphasis added). 
188. Id. at 307 (emphasis added). 
189. Id. at 307–08 (emphasis added). 
190. Id. at 309 (emphasis added). 
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the uncertain consequences of disclosure of a ‘guilty secret’ 
freely given in response to an unwarned but noncoercive 
question, as in this case.”191 
(9) “We must conclude that, absent deliberately coercive or 
improper tactics in obtaining the initial statement, the mere fact 
that a suspect has made an unwarned admission does not 
warrant a presumption of compulsion. A subsequent 
administration of Miranda warnings to a suspect who has given 
a voluntary but unwarned statement ordinarily should suffice to 
remove the conditions that precluded admission of the earlier 
statement.”192 
X.  WHAT WAS THE MIRANDA COURT TRYING TO DO? 
Friedrich Nietzsche once observed that the commonest stupidity 
consists of forgetting what one is trying to do.193 When the Supreme 
Court decided Miranda, what was it trying to do? 
It was trying to change the way the police did business. Now that the 
privilege against self-incrimination applied to the interrogation room as 
well as the courtroom, the police could no longer say or imply that they 
had a right to an answer or the authority to compel one. (It would be 
more accurate to say that the police never had the right to an answer or 
the lawful authority to compel one; they only led suspects to believe they 
did.) 
Moreover, now that the privilege applies to the interrogation room, 
the police can no longer say or imply that suspects will be “better off” if 
they “cooperate” with the police and “worse off” if they do not. Nor is 
that all. Now that the right to counsel applies to police interrogation 
(even the right to a lawyer at state expense if a suspect cannot afford to 
pay for one), the police cannot lead a suspect to believe that he or she 
must confront the police “all alone” for an indefinite period of time. 
                                                     
191. Id. at 312 (emphasis added). 
192. Id. at 314 (emphasis added). 
193. In L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pt. 1), 
46 YALE L.J. 52, 53 (1936), the authors refer to “Nietzsche’s observation, that the most common 
stupidity consists in forgetting what one is trying to do.” Unfortunately, the authors do not provide a 
source. According to the University of Michigan Law School Faculty Services Librarian, Seth 
Quidachay-Swan, the Fuller-Purdue reference to Nietzsche has made their version of the quote the 
basis for its current form. Mr. Quidachay- Swan adds that in FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, HUMAN, ALL 
TOO HUMAN (R.J. Hollingdale trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (1878), Nietzsche does say: 
“During the journey we commonly forget its goal. . . . Forgetting our objectives is the most frequent 
of all acts of stupidity.” Id. at 360. 
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It is never easy to get the police to change their conduct. It is much 
harder, however, when they have a strong incentive to continue to 
operate as usual. Elstad provides such an incentive. 
How can we expect the police to take Miranda seriously when they 
are aware that even though they disregard Miranda, the state will be able 
to use the testimony of any witness or any physical evidence that their 
misconduct brings to light? Unfortunately, the Elstad majority forgot the 
warning in Nardone that “[t]o forbid the direct use of methods  . . . but to 
put no curb on their full indirect use would only invite the very methods 
deemed ‘inconsistent with ethical standards and destructive of personal 
liberty.’”194 
Shortly after Miranda was handed down, Judge Henry Friendly 
recognized that “‘what data there are’ suggest that the obtaining of leads 
with which to obtain real or demonstrative evidence or prosecution 
witnesses is more important than getting statements for use in court.”195 
Some will retort, however, that although lawyers and law review writers 
may think this way, the average police officer does not. But the police 
do not have to think this way on their own so long as their instructors 
train them to think this way. Evidently they do. 
More than a decade ago (and it is fair to assume that since then this 
“training” has spread), Professor Charles Weisselberg reported that 
many California police officers were being encouraged to question 
“outside Miranda,” i.e., continue to question custodial suspects despite 
the fact that they had directly and unambiguously asserted their rights.196 
According to one training videotape, for example, a California deputy 
district attorney instructs the police as follows: 
The Miranda exclusionary rule . . . doesn’t have a fruits of the 
poisonous tree attached to it the way constitutional violations 
do. . . . [When we question someone who has invoked his 
Miranda rights,] [a]ll we lose is the statements taken in violation 
of Miranda. We do not lose physical evidence that resulted from 
that. We do not lose the testimony of other witnesses that we 
                                                     
194. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340 (1939) (per Frankfurter, J.). 
195. Henry J. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 
U. CIN. L. REV. 671, 712 n.176 (1968). A quarter-century later, another commentator indicated that 
nothing had changed. See David A. Wollin, Policing the Police: Should Miranda Violations Bear 
Fruit?, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 805, 845 (1992) (“Expert interrogators have long recognized, and continue 
to instruct, that a confession is a primary source for determining the existence and whereabouts of 
the fruits of a crime, such as documents or weapons.”). 
196. See Weisselberg, supra note 87, at 188. 
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learned about only by violating his Miranda invocation.197 
True, most custodial suspects waive their rights and agree to talk to 
the police. But if suspects do assert their rights, why would a determined 
police officer stop questioning? The officer is aware that the 
incriminating statements themselves must be excluded. But he is also 
aware—perhaps instructed not to forget—that any physical evidence or 
testimony obtained from heretofore unknown witnesses may still be 
admissible. 
After Quarles and Elstad were decided, Miranda supporters still had 
one remaining hope: sooner or later the Supreme Court would have to 
decide the constitutionality of a 1968 federal statute widely known as 
§ 3501, a statute which purported to abolish Miranda.198 If and when the 
Court struck down the statute as unconstitutional, thereby reaffirming (or 
resuscitating) the constitutionality of Miranda, the premise on which 
such cases as Tucker, Quarles, and Elstad were based would shatter. 
And the conclusions these cases had arrived at would topple. (Although 
it did not turn out this way, it was a reasonable expectation that 
considering Miranda a “constitutional decision” once again would lead 
to the collapse of such cases as Elstad.) 
XI.  THE STRANGE CASE OF DICKERSON V. UNITED STATES 
Fifteen years after Elstad was decided, the Court handed down 
Dickerson v. United States,199 the case that finally did address the 
constitutionality of § 3501. Surprisingly, Chief Justice Rehnquist (who 
up to this point had probably never had a kind word to say about 
Miranda) came to Miranda’s rescue. Equally surprisingly, however, the 
Chief Justice could find no fault with such cases as Tucker, Quarles, and 
Elstad, cases that had led many to believe that Miranda was not, or was 
no longer considered, a constitutional decision. 
When the Chief Justice discussed these cases, he treated them quite 
gingerly. Indeed, he was careful to leave them completely unscathed. 
                                                     
197. The full transcript of the videotape is reprinted in an appendix to Professor Weisselberg’s 
article. See Weisselberg, supra note 87, at 189–92. At the time the training tape was made it was not 
perfectly clear that physical evidence discovered as a result of a failure to follow Miranda, as well 
as a “second confession” following a Miranda violation, would be admissible. But the California 
district attorney turned out to be right. The lower courts “almost uniformly ruled” that Elstad 
applied to physical evidence. See Wollin, supra note 195, at 835–36. And the Supreme Court 
ultimately agreed. See infra notes 216–26. 
198. Compare Paul G. Cassell, The Statute that Time Forgot: 18 U.S.C. § 3501 and the 
Overhauling of Miranda, 85 IOWA L. REV. 175 (1999), with Kamisar, supra note 39. 
199. 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
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I believe Don Dripps spoke for many criminal procedure professors 
when he commented: 
[Once the Court granted certiorari in Dickerson, Court-watchers] 
knew the hour had come. At long last the Court would have to 
either repudiate Miranda, repudiate the prophylactic-rule cases, 
or offer some ingenious reconciliation of the two lines of 
precedent. The Supreme Court of the United States, however, 
doesn’t “have to” do anything, as the decision in Dickerson once 
again reminds us.200 
Because the Department of Justice would not defend the 
constitutionality of § 3501, the Court appointed Professor Paul Cassell to 
do so. Although I usually discount the complaints of losing counsel, this 
time, I believe, there is a good deal to be said for losing counsel’s 
reaction. 
When he read the opinion in Dickerson shortly after it was sent to him 
from the clerk’s office, Cassell’s “immediate reaction” was “Where’s the 
rest of the opinion?”201 Cassell had been so taken aback by the Chief 
Justice’s “cursory treatment” of the “deconstitutionalization” of 
Miranda, a treatment that Cassell understandably believes “leaves 
Miranda doctrine incoherent,” that he couldn’t help thinking that “some 
glitch in the transmission had eliminated the pages of discussion on the 
critical issues in the case.”202 
As discussed earlier, Elstad was an especially difficult case to 
reconcile with the Dickerson view that Miranda was a “constitutional 
decision.” Dissenting Justice Scalia was well aware of this and hit the 
Dickerson majority hard on this point. Scalia maintained, and I believe 
he was quite right, that “[t]he proposition that failure to comply with 
Miranda’s rules does not establish a constitutional violation was central 
to the holdings” of such cases as Elstad203—indeed, constituted “[t]he 
only reasoned basis for their outcome.”204 
How did Chief Justice Rehnquist handle Justice Scalia’s complaint? If 
ever there were a half-hearted response, it was Rehnquist’s: 
Our decision in [Elstad]—refusing to apply the traditional 
                                                     
200. Donald A. Dripps, Constitutional Theory for Criminal Procedure: Dickerson, Miranda, and 
the Continuing Quest for Broad-But-Shallow, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 33 (2001). 
201. See Paul G. Cassell, The Paths Not Taken: The Supreme Court’s Failure in Dickerson, 99 
MICH. L. REV. 898 (2001). 
202. Id. 
203. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 454 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Thomas, J.) (first emphasis 
added). 
204. Id. at 455. 
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“fruits” doctrine developed in Fourth Amendment cases—does 
not prove that Miranda is a nonconstitutional decision, but 
simply recognizes the fact that unreasonable searches under the 
Fourth Amendment are different from unwarned interrogation 
under the Fifth Amendment.205 
Justice Scalia called the Chief Justice’s response “true but supremely 
unhelpful.”206 One commentator, with good reason, put it more strongly: 
Rehnquist’s “non-answer to the question of why the traditional fruits 
doctrine . . . does not apply to Miranda violations . . . comes 
dangerously close to being a non sequitur.”207 
In the Tucker case, then-Justice Rehnquist became the first member of 
the Court in a case involving Miranda to distinguish between statements 
that were actually “coerced” or “compelled” and those obtained merely 
in violation of Miranda’s “prophylactic rules.”208 A quarter-century 
later, however, when he wrote his majority opinion in Dickerson, the 
Chief Justice was careful never to refer to the Miranda rules as 
“prophylactic.”209 On the other hand, Rehnquist did work hard in 
Dickerson to avoid undermining any of the earlier cases that had carved 
out exceptions to Miranda on the premise that the landmark case was not 
(or was no longer regarded as) a constitutional decision. 
Only a few years after Dickerson was handed down, however, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist joined two plurality opinions by Justice Thomas that 
read as if Dickerson had never been written: Chavez v. Martinez210 and 
United States v. Patane.211 In Martinez, Justice Thomas contrasted 
“prophylactic rules” such as Miranda rights with “core constitutional 
right[s]” such as the Self-Incrimination Clause.212 In Patane, Thomas 
characterized Miranda as a “prophylactic employed to protect against 
violations of the Self-Incrimination Clause.”213 He also reminded us that 
prophylactic rules such as Miranda “necessarily sweep beyond the 
                                                     
205. Id. at 441. 
206. Id. at 455. 
207. Klein, supra note 144, at 1073. 
208. See supra notes 102–21. 
209. See generally Yale Kamisar, Dickerson v. United States: The Case that Disappointed 
Miranda’s Critics—and Then Its Supporters, in THE REHNQUIST LEGACY 106 (Craig M. Bradley ed. 
2006). 
210. 538 U.S. 760 (2003). Justice Thomas’s plurality opinion was joined by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist in its entirety and in large part by Justices O’Connor and Scalia. 
211. 542 U.S. 630 (2004). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia joined Justice Thomas’s 
plurality opinion. Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice O’Connor, concurred in the judgment. 
212. Martinez, 538 U.S. at 770. 
213. Patane, 542 U.S. at 636. 
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actual protections of the Self-Incrimination Clause.”214 
It is hard not to sympathize with Judge Ebel, the Tenth Circuit judge 
who excluded the physical evidence in Patane only to be reversed by the 
Supreme Court. Mr. Patane had been arrested outside his home and 
handcuffed. A federal agent, who had been informed that Patane, a 
convicted felon, illegally possessed a Glock pistol, failed to give him a 
complete set of Miranda warnings. As a result, the government 
conceded that any statements Patane made about the location of the 
Glock had to be excluded. But it insisted that the Glock itself (found 
where the defendant said it was, on a wooden shelf in his bedroom) 
should be admissible. The government relied heavily on two pre-
Dickerson cases, Tucker and Elstad. But speaking for a unanimous 
three-judge panel, Judge Ebel made short work of these cases: 
[B]oth [Tucker and Elstad] were predicated upon the premise 
that the Miranda rule was a prophylactic rule, rather than a 
constitutional rule. . . . However, the premise upon which 
Tucker and Elstad relied was fundamentally altered in Dickerson 
[where] the Supreme Court declared that Miranda articulated a 
constitutional rule rather than merely a prophylactic one. Thus, 
Dickerson undermined the logic underlying Tucker and 
Elstad.215 
Some judges might have stopped at this point, but evidently Judge 
Ebel could not do so. He continued: 
Further, the rule urged upon us by the Government appears to 
make little sense as a matter of policy. From a practical 
perspective, we see little difference between the confessional 
statement “The Glock is in my bedroom on a shelf,” which even 
the Government concedes is clearly excluded under 
Miranda . . . and the Government’s introduction of the Glock 
found in the defendant’s bedroom on the shelf as a result of his 
                                                     
214. Id. at 639. In a companion case to Patane, Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004), a 5-4 
majority, per Souter, J., did exclude a “second confession.” But Seibert grew out of egregious facts: 
The principal police interrogator had admittedly been trained to use a two-stage interrogation 
technique designed to circumvent Miranda. At the first questioning session with the defendant the 
police interrogator deliberately failed to give any warnings at all—which he had been trained to do. 
Moreover, the statement ultimately admitted into evidence was “largely a repeat” of the statement 
the police had obtained during the first questioning session. 
  Justice Kennedy cast the deciding vote in Seibert. He left little doubt that he (1) approved Elstad’s 
reasoning; (2) believed that Elstad had been unaffected by Dickerson; and (3) would admit the 
incriminating statement obtained during the second questioning session in a less egregious “second 
confession” case. 
215. United States v. Patane, 304 F.3d 1013, 1019 (10th Cir. 2002), rev’d, 542 U.S. 630 (2004). 
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unconstitutionally obtained confession. If anything, to adopt the 
Government’s rule would allow it to make greater use of the 
confession than merely introducing the words themselves.216 
In reversing the Tenth Circuit opinion in Patane, Justice Thomas took 
account of Judge Ebel’s observation that the position advocated by the 
government “appears to make little sense as a matter of policy.”217 
“[P]utting policy aside,” retorted Thomas, “we have held that ‘[t]he 
word “witness” in the constitutional text limits the’ scope of the Self-
Incrimination Clause to testimonial evidence.”218 
In the context of the Patane case, Justice Thomas’s statement is 
misleading. Mr. Patane had not been ordered to put on a hat to see 
whether it fit properly.219 Nor had he been required to provide a blood 
sample to test for its alcoholic content.220 What Mr. Patane was 
complaining about was the use of evidence derived from an 
incriminating statement. Ever since the 120-year-old case of 
Counselman v. Hitchcock221 was decided (a case Justice Thomas never 
mentions), it has been clear that the Self-Incrimination Clause protects 
against the derivative use of compelled testimony as well as the 
compelled testimony itself. 
Evidently, Justice Thomas refuses to believe that a statement violates 
the privilege simply because the police officer who obtained it from a 
custodial suspect failed to comply with Miranda. But that was what 
Dickerson was supposed to be all about—and Justices Scalia and 
Thomas lost, 7-2. The Dickerson majority informed us that once the 
Self-Incrimination Clause was held to apply to the interrogation room 
“something more than the [pre-Miranda] totality [of circumstances] test 
was necessary”222—that because “§ 3501 reinstates the totality test as 
sufficient” it “cannot be sustained if Miranda is to remain the law.”223 
What Justice Thomas had to say about Miranda in the post-Dickerson 
era should not have come as a great surprise. After all, Justice Thomas 
did join Justice Scalia’s forceful dissent in Dickerson. But how could 
Chief Justice Rehnquist—the author of the majority opinion in 
                                                     
216. Id. at 1027 (emphasis in original). 
217. Patane, 542 U.S. at 643. 
218. Id. at 643–44. 
219. Cf. Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910) (requiring a person to put on a blouse is not a 
violation of the privilege). 
220. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (not a violation of the privilege). 
221. 142 U.S. 547 (1892). 
222. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 442 (2000) (emphasis added). 
223. Id. at 442–43. 
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Dickerson—join Justice Thomas’s opinions in Martinez and Patane? 
How could Rehnquist agree that Miranda was not a constitutional 
decision after all? 
It was almost as if Chief Justice Rehnquist had (a) written his 
opinions in Tucker and Quarles when he was quite healthy; (b) written 
the majority opinion in Dickerson when he was suffering from amnesia; 
and (c) recovered fully from his amnesia when he joined Justice 
Thomas’s opinions in Martinez and Patane. 
As might be expected, many theories have been advanced to explain 
Rehnquist’s surprising vote in Dickerson.224 One of the most interesting 
theories is that the Chief Justice decided to vote with the majority so that 
he could assign the opinion to himself rather than let it go to someone 
like Justice Stevens.225 Some people may find this theory disturbing. But 
when one (a) takes into account the Chief Justice’s performance in the 
post-Dickerson cases of Martinez and Patane and (b) keeps in mind that 
the person offering this theory is a great admirer of Rehnquist’s (and 
also a former law clerk to him), this theory takes on a certain 
plausibility: 
If there had been four votes to overrule Miranda, it is difficult to 
imagine that, given his decades of principled opposition, the 
Chief would not have readily provided the fifth. But the votes 
were not there. 
  In their place was genuine peril. . . . [I]f [§ 3501] were 
unconstitutional, that would presumably be because Miranda 
was not mere prophylaxis, but itself required by the 
Constitution. 
  Had the Chief voted with the dissenters, the majority opinion 
would have been assigned by the senior Justice in the majority, 
in this case Justice Stevens. And Justice Stevens, of course, had 
a very different view of Miranda than did the Chief. . . . 
  [A holding that Miranda is required by the Constitution] 
would have undermined the foundation for most if not all of the 
                                                     
224. Most of the participants in Symposium: Miranda After Dickerson: The Future of Confession 
Law, 99 MICH. L. REV. 879, 879–1247 (2001) suggested various reasons why Chief Justice 
Rehnquist voted the way he did. (The participants were: Paul Cassell, Yale Kamisar, Susan R. 
Klein, Richard A. Leo, Laurie Magid, Stephen J. Schulhofer, David A. Strauss, William J. Stuntz, 
George C. Thomas III, Charles D. Weisselberg and Welsh S. White.) See also Craig Bradley, 
Behind the Dickerson Decision, 36 TRIAL 80 (Oct. 2000); Michael C. Dorf & Barry Friedman, 
Shared Constitutional Interpretation, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 61; Daniel M. Katz, Institutional Rules, 
Strategic Behavior, and the Legacy of Chief Justice Rehnquist: Setting the Record Straight in 
Dickerson v. United States, 22 J. L. & POL 303 (2006). 
225. R. Ted Cruz, In Memoriam: William H. Rehnquist, 119 HARV. L. REV. 10 (2005). 
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previous decisions limiting Miranda, quietly threatening three 
decades of the Chief’s careful efforts to cabin in that decision 
appropriately. Therefore, in my judgment, the Chief acted 
decisively to avoid that consequence. He voted with the majority 
and assigned the opinion to himself. 
  With that backdrop, the majority opinion in Dickerson is, in 
many respects, amusing to read. Its holding can be characterized 
as threefold: First, Miranda is NOT required by the 
Constitution; it is merely prophylactic and its exceptions remain 
good law. Second, [§ 3501] is not good law. Third, do not ask 
why, and please, never, ever, ever cite this opinion for any 
reason.226 
Although, as Mr. Cruz suggests, Chief Justice Rehnquist may have 
wished that his Dickerson opinion would “never, ever” be cited “for any 
reason,” it has been. In Patane, Justice Thomas told us that “[t]he 
[Dickerson] Court’s reliance on our Miranda precedents [including 
Elstad] further demonstrates the continuing validity of those 
decisions.”227 To reaffirm the constitutionality of Miranda without 
repudiating cases such as Elstad is not easy. But to read Dickerson as 
somehow “relying” on cases such as Elstad and demonstrating their 
“continuing validity” is truly extraordinary. Yet Chief Justice Rehnquist 
joined Justice Thomas’s opinion. 
XII.  BERGHUIS V. THOMPKINS: THE COURT INFLICTS A 
HEAVY BLOW ON MIRANDA 
As a general matter, law professors like to be quoted by the U.S. 
Supreme Court. But there are exceptional cases. For Professor Fred 
Inbau, senior co-author of the Inbau-Reid police interrogation 
manual228—considered “the undisputed bible of police interrogation 
since its initial publication in 1962”229—the Miranda opinion’s 
                                                     
226. Id. at 14–15. Mr. Cruz takes comfort in the fact that Chief Justice Rehnquist never said in 
Dickerson that the Miranda warnings are required by the Constitution. See id. at 15 n.26. But to say 
that would be incorrect. As the Miranda Court told us, and as Rehnquist reminded us in Dickerson 
that Miranda told us, “the Constitution would not preclude legislative solutions that differed from 
the prescribed Miranda warnings but which were ‘at least as effective in apprising accused persons 
of their right of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it.’” Dickerson, 530 
U.S. at 440. 
227. United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 640 (2010) (emphasis added). 
228. FRED E. INBAU & JOHN E. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (1962). 
229. Robert M. Thomas Jr., Fred Inbau, 89, Criminologist Who Perfected Interrogation, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 28, 1998, at B9. 
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references to and quotations from his work marked such an exception. 
In the course of setting forth what he thought was occurring in most 
“interrogation rooms” throughout the land (the police prefer to call them 
“interview rooms”), Chief Justice Warren turned to various interrogation 
manuals. Warren believed (and I agree with him) that these manuals 
“professedly present the most enlightened and effective means presently 
used to obtain statements through custodial interrogation. By 
considering [them], it is possible to describe procedures observed and 
noted around the country.”230 Warren referred to or quoted from the 
Inbau-Reid manual nine times—but never with approval.231 
Miranda not only had an impact on police interrogation and the law 
school curriculum.232 It also affected book publishing. The landmark 
Miranda case necessitated a new edition of the Inbau-Reid manual as 
soon as possible. And a new edition was published only a year after 
Miranda was decided. As Charles Weisselberg has noted,233 in their first 
post-Miranda edition, Inbau and Reid assured their readers that “all but a 
very few of the interrogation tactics and techniques presented in our 
earlier publication are still valid if used after the recently prescribed 
warnings have been given to the suspect . . . [and] after he has waived 
his self-incrimination privilege and his right to counsel.”234 It seemed 
obvious to Professor Inbau that Miranda required the police to obtain a 
waiver of the right to remain silent and the right to counsel before 
subjecting the custodial suspect to the interrogation process. 
In the 1960s, few, if any, believed that a day would come when the 
U.S. Supreme Court would read Miranda more narrowly and more 
                                                     
230. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 449 (1966). 
231. Id. at 449–55. Although one commentator undoubtedly exaggerated, there is something to 
what he said about Chief Justice Warren’s use of the Inbau-Reid manual, Albert W. Alschuler, 
Constraint and Confession, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 957, 971 (1997): It “was exhibited in the Miranda 
opinion like a relic from a medieval torture chamber.” 
  Chief Justice Warren may have been unhappy with some of the psychological tactics 
recommended by Inbau, but the latter was a strong opponent of anything resembling the “third 
degree.” See generally Ronald J. Allen, Tribute to Fred Inbau, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1271 
(1999); Joseph D. Grano, Selling the Idea to Tell the Truth: The Professional Interrogation and 
Modern Confessions Law, 84 MICH. L. REV. 662 (1986); Yale Kamisar, Fred E. Inbau: “The 
Importance of Being Guilty,” 68 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 182 (1977); Yale Kamisar, What is an 
“Involuntary” Confession: Some Comments on Inbau and Reid’s Criminal Interrogation and 
Confessions, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 728 (1963). 
232. Until Miranda was handed down, very few law schools, if any, offered criminal procedure 
as a separate course. That changed very quickly. 
233. Weisselberg, supra note 3, at 1528. 
234. Id. (quoting FRED E. INBAU & JOHN E. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 
1 (2d ed. 1967) (emphasis added by Professor Weisselberg)). 
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grudgingly than did Inbau, a proponent of deceit and deception in 
obtaining confessions.235 But that day did come—in 2010, when the 
Court handed down Berghuis v. Thompkins.236 
I once said that Elstad, or at least an expansive reading of this case, 
would administer a crippling blow to Miranda.237 I considered Elstad the 
worst that could happen to Miranda short of overruling it.238 But that 
was before Thompkins was decided. Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the 
Court discusses the facts of Thompkins at considerable length. A 
summary of these facts follows: 
Detective Helgert and another police officer questioned defendant 
Thompkins about a shooting in which one person died. The interrogation 
was conducted in the early afternoon in a small room. Thompkins sat in 
a straight-backed chair. At no time during his meeting with the police 
did Thompkins express a desire to see a lawyer or say he wanted to 
remain silent. Moreover, he never said that he did not want to talk to the 
police. But he declined to sign a written acknowledgement that he had 
been advised of his rights and understood them. During the 
interrogation, which lasted about three hours, Thompkins was largely 
silent, but he did give a few “limited verbal responses,” such as “yeah,” 
“no,” or “I don’t know.” 
At the outset of the interrogation, Detective Helgert presented 
Thompkins with a form containing the four standard Miranda warnings 
and a fifth warning that read: “You have the right to decide at any time 
before or during questioning to use your right to remain silent and your 
right to talk with a lawyer while you are being questioned.” At Helgert’s 
request, Thompkins read the fifth warning out loud. Helgert himself then 
read the four standard Miranda warnings out loud. 
About two hours and forty-five minutes into the interrogation, the 
detective asked Thompkins a series of questions, beginning with whether 
he believed in God. Thompkins’ reply to the first question was that he 
did believe in God, his eyes “well[ing] up in tears.” Helgert’s next 
question was: “Do you pray to God?” Again, Thompkins answered that 
he did. Finally, the detective asked: “Do you pray to God to forgive you 
for shooting that boy down?” Thompkins answered that he did, looking 
away. About fifteen minutes later, after Thompkins had refused to make 
                                                     
235. See Thomas, supra note 229. 
236. 560 U.S. __,130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010). 
237. See Yale Kamisar, Confessions, Search and Seizure and the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L.J. 
465, 478–80 (1999). 
238. See id. at 480. 
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a written confession, the interrogation ended.239 
The Michigan trial court refused to exclude Thompkins’ statements. 
He was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without 
parole. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed. On habeas corpus, the 
federal district court denied relief. But a unanimous three-judge panel of 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, concluding that 
the state courts had unreasonably applied clearly established law and had 
based their decisions on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(AEDPA), a federal court cannot grant habeas corpus relief unless the 
state court’s adjudication of the merits was “contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law.”240 
According to the Sixth Circuit, the state court unreasonably 
determined the facts because “the evidence demonstrates that 
Thompkins was silent for two hours and forty-five minutes.”241 
Moreover, the defendant’s “persistent silence for nearly three hours in 
response to questioning and repeated invitations to tell his side of the 
story offered a clear and unequivocal message to the officers: 
Thompkins did not wish to waive his rights.”242 
A.  Must the Police Obtain a Waiver of Rights Before Interrogation 
Commences? 
A 5-4 majority of the Supreme Court reversed. Justice Kennedy wrote 
the opinion of the Court. Although Miranda prevents the police from 
interrogating suspects without first providing them with the now-familiar 
Miranda warnings, wrote Kennedy, “it does not impose a formalistic 
waiver procedure that a suspect must follow to relinquish those 
rights.”243 Where “the prosecution shows that a Miranda warning was 
given and that it was understood by the accused, an accused’s uncoerced 
statement establishes an implied waiver of the right to remain silent.”244 
The majority emphasized that the primary protection afforded custodial 
suspects who are, or are going to be, interrogated, ‘“is the Miranda 
warnings themselves.’”245 
                                                     
239. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2256–57. 
240. See id. at 2258 (quoting 28 U.S.C § 2254(d)(1) (2006)). 
241. See id. 
242. See id. at 2258–59. 
243. Id. at 2262. 
244. Id. 
245. Id. at 2263 (quoting Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 460 (1994)). 
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Thompkins argued that the police could not interrogate him until they 
first obtained a waiver of his rights. “The Miranda rule and its 
requirements are met,” responded the Court, “if a suspect receives 
adequate Miranda warnings, understands them, and has an opportunity 
to invoke the rights before giving any answers or admissions.”246 Since 
Thompkins received and understood the Miranda warnings, and never 
invoked his Miranda rights, he “waive[d] the right to remain silent by 
making an uncoerced statement to the police.”247 The police did not 
obtain an explicit or specific waiver of Thompkins’ right before 
interrogating him.248 According to the Thompkins majority, however, the 
police did not have to do so. 
During the oral arguments, Justice Breyer expressed surprise at the 
government’s contention that the waiver of Miranda rights could take 
place after the police had begun interrogating the suspect.249 I had the 
same reaction and reread the Miranda opinion, expecting to find strong, 
explicit language prohibiting such a course of action. Instead I 
discovered that the language in Miranda was not nearly as explicit as I 
thought it was. At one point, Miranda does come very close to saying 
what I was looking for: “After such warnings have been given, and such 
opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and 
intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a 
statement.”250 But the Court does not unequivocally say that the only 
time the police must obtain a waiver of Miranda rights is immediately 
after the warnings have been given and before any interrogation has 
commenced. And the sentence immediately before the sentence quoted 
above reads: “Opportunity to exercise these rights must be afforded to 
[the suspect] throughout the interrogation.”251 
At another point, Miranda also comes close to saying what I hoped to 
find: “The requirement of warnings and waiver of rights is a 
fundamental with respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege and not 
simply a preliminary ritual to existing methods of interrogation.”252 But 
the very next sentence veers off: “The warnings required and the waiver 
necessary in accordance with our opinion today are . . . prerequisites to 
                                                     
246. Id. 
247. Id. at 2264. 
248. See id. 
249. See KAMISAR, LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 107, at 650. 
250. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966). 
251. Id. 
252. Id. at 476. 
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the admissibility of any statement made by a defendant.253 Of course a 
waiver of rights must take place before any statement is ultimately 
admissible, but must the waiver occur before any interrogation has 
begun or may it take place later? 
At still another point, Miranda tells us: “The principles announced 
today deal with the protection which must be given to the privilege 
against self-incrimination when the individual is first subjected to police 
interrogation while in custody . . . .”254 But what did the Court mean by 
“the principles announced today?” Did it mean all the principles—
including when and how waivers have to take place? Or did the Court 
mean only the principles pertaining to how and when the warnings must 
be given and how and when custodial suspects may assert their rights? 
When Miranda was decided, the member of the Court who most 
clearly recognized that the landmark decision required a suspect to 
waive his or her rights before interrogation commenced (although he 
was not happy about it) seems to have been dissenting Justice White. 
The very first sentence of White’s twenty-page dissenting opinion reads: 
“The proposition that the privilege against self-incrimination forbids in-
custody interrogation without the warnings specified in the majority 
opinion and without a clear waiver of counsel has no significant support 
in the history of the privilege or in the language of the Fifth 
Amendment.”255 Moreover, ten pages later, Justice White observes that 
“apparently, it is only if the accused is also warned of his right to 
counsel and waives both that right and the right against self-
incrimination that the inherent compulsiveness of interrogation 
disappears.”256 
Although I believe Justice White’s understanding of what Miranda 
requires the police to do is noteworthy, I realize, too, that sometimes a 
dissenting or concurring Justice may distort or exaggerate the majority’s 
ruling. Therefore, even taking into account Justice White’s dissent, one 
may plausibly conclude that the explicit language of the Court is not 
conclusive on the point in time when the waiver of rights must occur. 
                                                     
253. Id. (emphasis added). 
254. Id. at 477. 
255. Id. at 526 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Harlan and Stewart, JJ.) (emphasis added). 
256. Id. at 536 (emphasis added); see also id. at 537 (“[T]he Court declares that the accused may 
not be interrogated without counsel present, absent a waiver of the right to counsel . . . .”) (emphasis 
added). 
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B.  The Implications of Miranda’s Concern About the “Compelling 
Atmosphere” of Police Interrogation 
However, there is another way to establish that the Thompkins Court 
went astray when it ruled that the police could begin interrogating 
custodial suspects before they waived their rights and then utilize the 
interrogation process itself in order to obtain the necessary waiver. This 
other route is based on the implications of the Miranda opinion’s 
pervasive concern and anxiety about what is variously called “the 
compelling atmosphere of the in-custody interrogation,”257 “the secret 
interrogation process,”258 “the compulsion to speak in the isolated setting 
of the police station,”259 and the “incommunicado interrogation of 
individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere.”260 
Miranda also tells us that in each of the four cases before the Court 
the “interrogation environment” was “created for no purpose other than 
to subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner. This atmosphere 
carries its own badge of intimidation.”261 At another point, Miranda 
observes: “An individual swept from familiar surroundings into police 
custody, surrounded by antagonistic forces, and subjected to the 
techniques of persuasion described [in the police manuals] cannot be 
otherwise than under compulsion to speak.”262 At still another point, the 
Miranda Court recalls that in Escobedo v. Illinois,263 “[t]he entire thrust 
of police interrogation there, as in all [four of the cases before the Court] 
today, was to put the defendant in such an emotional state as to impair 
his capacity for rational judgment.”264 
One of the basic premises of Miranda was that “the process of 
custodial interrogation contains inherent pressures that compel suspects 
to speak.”265 Charles Weisselberg, who has studied the issue extensively, 
tells us that the principal ingredients of custodial interrogation have 
changed very little since Miranda: “the basic psychological approach to 
interrogation described in the Miranda decision remains prevalent in the 
                                                     
257. Id. at 465. 
258. Id. at 470. 
259. Id. at 461. 
260. Id. at 445. 
261. Id. at 457. 
262. Id. at 461. 
263. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). 
264. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 465. 
265. Weisselberg, supra note 3, at 1522. 
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United States”266 and “many of the same tactics discussed by the justices 
in 1966” are “widely used” today.267 
It is hard to believe that the Miranda Court, a Court which was so 
troubled by in-custodial police interrogation, would (a) require the 
police to warn custodial suspects of their rights, yet (b) permit the police 
to intimidate, mislead, deceive, bluff, coax, or trick these same suspects 
into “waiving” their rights by subjecting them to interrogation. This is 
why I agree with Professor Weisselberg (he actually made this point two 
years before Thompkins was decided), who explained why the Miranda 
Court must have meant that a waiver of rights had to take place before 
interrogation commences: “Given the [Miranda] Court’s extensive and 
critical discussion of the interrogation manuals, this could only mean 
that waivers could not be obtained while interrogators were applying the 
tactics advocated in the manuals.”268 
Quoting with approval from Davis v. United States, the Thompkins 
Court does say that “the primary protection afforded suspects subject[ed] 
to custodial interrogation is the Miranda warnings themselves.”269 But 
why is this so? As the late Welsh White pointed out a decade ago, 
“[t]ranscripts of modern interrogations indicate that police interrogators 
are often so overwhelmingly in control of the interrogation—dictating 
the pace of the questioning and the topics under discussion—that the 
suspect has no practical opportunity to invoke his rights during the most 
critical parts of the interrogation.”270 
C.  What Likely Takes Place in the Interrogation Room? 
In the course of rejecting Mr. Thompkins’ argument that the police 
could not question him “until they obtained a waiver first,” the 
Thompkins Court had some nice things to say about interrogation: 
Interrogation provides the suspect with additional information 
that can put his or her decision to waive, or not to invoke, into 
perspective. As questioning commences and then continues, the 
                                                     
266. Id. at 1529. 
267. Id. at 1537. 
268. Id. at 1528. 
269. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2263 (2010) (quoting Davis v. United 
States, 512 U.S. 452, 460 (1994)). 
270. White, supra note 2, at 1215. Professor White further cites “examples of questioning that is 
so rapid that the suspect has no practical opportunity to halt the questioning in order to invoke his 
rights.” Id. at 1215 n.24 (citing Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Social Psychology of Police 
Interrogation: The Theory and Classification of True and False Confessions, 16 STUD. L. POL. & 
SOC’Y 189, 227–30 (1997)). 
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suspect has the opportunity to consider the choices he or she 
faces and to make a more informed decision, either to insist on 
silence or to cooperate. When the suspect knows that Miranda 
rights can be invoked at any time, he or she has the opportunity 
to reassess his or her immediate and longterm interests. 
Cooperation with the police may result in more favorable 
treatment for the suspect; the apprehension of accomplices; the 
prevention of continuing injury and fear; beginning steps 
towards relief or solace for the victims; and the beginning of the 
suspect’s own return to the law and the social order it seeks to 
protect.271 
This, I submit, is a highly sanitized description of the interrogation 
process. One almost gets the feeling that the suspect is having a 
straightforward talk with his own lawyer about the strengths and 
weaknesses of his case. But the people who are providing the suspect 
with what the Court calls “the opportunity to consider the choices he or 
she faces and to make a more informed decision” are not the suspect’s 
friends or advisors (although they often pretend to be), but his 
antagonists. Their job is not to help the suspect “make a more informed 
decision” (although they often pretend it is), but to figure out how best to 
bury him—or, to put it more precisely, how best to get him to “dig his 
own grave.” 
David Simon knows something about interrogation. He took a leave 
of absence from his newspaper to study how police interrogation was 
conducted by the Baltimore Police Department. He had unlimited access 
to the city’s homicide detectives for one year. His book, Homicide: A 
Year on the Killing Streets, was the result.272 According to Mr. Simon: 
With rare exception, a confession is compelled, provoked and 
manipulated from a suspect by a detective who has been trained 
in a generally deceitful art. That is the essence of interrogation, 
and those who believe that a straightforward conversation 
between a cop and a criminal—devoid of any treachery—is 
going to solve a crime are somewhat beyond naive.273 
Mr. Simon is convinced that police interrogation is necessary. 
“Without a chance for a detective to manipulate a suspect’s mind,” he 
                                                     
271. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2264. 
272. DAVID SIMON, HOMICIDE: A YEAR ON THE KILLING STREETS (1991). In an author’s note, 
Mr. Simon tells us that his book is a “work of journalism” and that the events he has written about 
“occurred in the manner described.” Id. at 627. 
273. Id. at 211. 
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notes, “a lot of bad people would simply go free.”274 But he is 
uncomfortable about it, because, as he sees it, the interrogation process 
is basically fraudulent: 
[A homicide detective] becomes a salesman, a huckster as 
thieving and silver-tongued as any man who ever moved used 
cars or aluminum siding—more so, in fact, when you consider 
that he’s selling long prison terms to customers who have no 
genuine need for the product. 
. . . The fraud that claims it is somehow in a suspect’s interest to 
talk with police will forever be the catalyst in any criminal 
interrogation.275 
Richard Leo has a very different background than David Simon. Leo 
is both a lawyer and a criminologist. He has witnessed 120 live 
interrogations and studied over 1500 electronically recorded ones. He 
has also interviewed more than 100 police interrogators.276 When 
discussing the interrogation process, Professor Leo also uses the “fraud” 
word: 
Police interrogation in the American adversary system is firmly 
rooted in fraud. Modern interrogation is fraudulent not simply 
because police are legally permitted to—and frequently do—lie 
to suspects about such things as the seriousness of the crime or 
case evidence (e.g., fingerprints, eyewitnesses or DNA results) 
that they do not possess. It is also based on fraud because 
detectives seek to create the illusion that they share a common 
interest with the suspect and that he can escape or mitigate 
punishment only by cooperating with them and providing a full 
confession. Although the suspect’s self-interest would usually 
best be served by remaining completely silent, interrogators seek 
at every step to convince him that what is in their professional 
self-interest is somehow in his personal self-interest. The entire 
interrogation process is carefully staged to hide the fact that 
police interrogators are the suspect’s adversary.277 
                                                     
274. Id. at 212. 
275. Id. at 213. 
276. E-mail from Richard A. Leo, Assoc. Professor of Law, Univ. of S.F., to author (Feb. 4, 
2012) (on file with author). 
277. LEO, supra note 2, at 25; see also id. at 34, 325–26. 
  Consider, too, Saul M. Kassin et al., Police Interviewing and Interrogation: A Self-Report Survey 
of Police Practices and Beliefs, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 381, 383–84 (2007) (“The stated objective 
of interrogation is to move a presumed guilty suspect from denial to admission. The techniques used 
are thus designed to overcome a suspect’s resistance and to induce him or her to 
confess. . . . [Professors] Ofshe and Leo (1997) have suggested that interrogation can best be 
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D.  “Waiver by Confession” 
Thompkins disregarded Miranda in other respects. At one point, 
Miranda warned that “a heavy burden rests on the government to 
demonstrate that [custodial suspects] knowingly and intelligently 
waived” their rights278—a “burden rightly on its shoulders” because “the 
State is responsible for establishing the isolated circumstances under 
which the interrogation takes place.”279 But now that Thompkins is on 
the books, the state’s burden has lightened greatly. 
To be sure, in order to establish a valid waiver of rights, the 
prosecution must not only show that the Miranda warnings were 
followed by an uncoerced incriminating statement. It must also establish 
that the suspect understood his or her Miranda rights.280 As the 
Thompkins case itself illustrates, however, this will rarely cause the 
prosecution any difficulty. 
If the suspect was afforded the opportunity to read a written copy of 
the Miranda warnings, the prosecution need only show that the suspect 
could read and understand English.281 If the police read the warnings 
aloud, the prosecution need only show that the suspect heard them and 
understood English.282 
Miranda also told us that “a valid waiver will not be presumed simply 
from the silence of the accused after warnings are given or simply from 
the fact that a confession was in fact eventually obtained.”283 But this 
caution no longer appears to be operative. 
The Thompkins majority tells us so about as clearly as one can: “In 
sum, a suspect who has received and understood the Miranda warnings, 
and has not invoked his Miranda rights, waives the right to remain silent 
by making an uncoerced statement to the police.”284 
                                                     
understood as a two-step psychological process in which the interrogator first seeks to convince the 
suspect that he or she is trapped and then attempts to induce the suspect to perceive that the benefits 
of confessing outweigh the costs.”). 
278. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966). 
279. Id. 
280. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2263 (2010). 
281. See id. at 2262. 
282. See id. at 2261–62. 
283. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475. 
284. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2264. Earlier in its opinion, the majority had said virtually the same 
thing. See id. at 2262, 2263. The majority also observed more generally: 
As a general proposition, the law can presume than an individual who, with a full 
understanding of his or her rights, acts in a manner inconsistent with their exercise and has 
made a deliberate choice to relinquish the protection those rights afford. . . . 
. . . Thompkins’ answer to Helgert’s question about praying to God for forgiveness . . . was 
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An amicus brief filed on behalf of Mr. Thompkins anticipated how 
the Court might decide the case and called it “waiver by confession.”285 
Such a description of the Thompkins ruling will undoubtedly strike some 
as quite harsh, but isn’t it basically right? As the amicus brief observes: 
“If a suspect’s eventual inculpatory statement suffices to show waiver, 
then there will always be a waiver; no Miranda case would ever be 
litigated in the absence of an inculpatory statement.”286 
Some may view Thompkins as simply another instance of chipping 
away at Miranda. I would put it more strongly. I would go so far as to 
say that Thompkins is a case where the Court fired point-blank at 
Miranda. Thompkins requires a suspect to prove that he invoked his 
right to remain silent instead of requiring the prosecution to prove that 
the suspect waived that right. As two of the nation’s leading 
commentators on the subject recently observed: “[In] removing the last 
residue of the ‘heavy burden’ waiver language from Miranda doctrine, 
Thompkins is perhaps the most significant Miranda case yet decided.”287 
At one point, the Thompkins majority relied on North Carolina v. 
Butler:288 “Butler made clear that a waiver of Miranda rights may be 
implied through ‘the defendant’s silence, coupled with an understanding 
of his rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver.’”289 But Butler 
was a case about the specificity of an effective waiver, not when the 
waiver must take place. The most plausible reading of the Butler record 
is that the event which might have constituted an effective waiver—the 
suspect’s statement “I will talk to you but I am not signing any 
form”290—took place immediately after he had been advised of his 
rights. 
Although Butler is often called an “implied waiver” case, there is 
nothing implicit about the statement “I will talk to you but . . . .”291 It 
                                                     
sufficient to show a course of conduct indicating waiver.  
Id. at 2262–63. 
285. Brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) and the ACLU 
as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 6, Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (No. 08-1470). 
286. Id. at 3 (emphasis in original). This is a slight exaggeration. In a few instances the 
inculpatory statement might be deemed coerced. But then we would no longer be dealing with a 
simple Miranda violation. 
287. GEORGE C. THOMAS III & RICHARD A. LEO, CONFESSIONS OF GUILT: FROM TORTURE TO 
MIRANDA AND BEYOND 192 (2012). 
288. 441 U.S. 369 (1979) (per Stewart, J.). 
289. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2261. 
290. See Butler, 441 U.S. at 370, 371. 
291. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2266, 2271 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, 
Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.). 
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might be more accurate to call Butler a dispute about whether a valid 
waiver could be “qualified” or “conditional” or must be “formal” or 
“formalistic.”292 
The Thompkins majority also relied on Justice Brennan’s concurring 
opinion in Connecticut v. Barrett.293 According to the Thompkins 
majority, Justice Brennan recognized in his Barrett concurrence that 
earlier (in Butler) the Court had “‘retreated’ from the ‘language and 
tenor of the Miranda opinion,’ which ‘suggested that the Court would 
require that a waiver . . . be ‘specifically made.’”294 As the quotation 
itself indicates, however, Brennan never suggested that the Court had 
retreated on another front—the issue presented in Thompkins—the point 
in time when a waiver of rights has to take place. 
The Thompkins Court also relied on Davis v. United States.295 Davis 
had ruled that a suspect invoking the Miranda right to counsel must do 
so “unambiguously.”296 The Thompkins Court could see “no principled 
reason to adopt different standards for determining when an accused has 
invoked the Miranda right to remain silent and the Miranda right to 
counsel.”297 
First of all, Davis involved a suspect who had already waived his 
right to remain silent, but changed his mind some ninety minutes later—
when the interrogation was well underway.298 The Davis majority 
seemed to consider this factor quite important: “We . . . hold that, after a 
knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights, law enforcement 
officers may continue questioning until and unless the suspect clearly 
requests an attorney.”299 
Moreover, Justice Souter, who wrote a concurring opinion in Davis, 
                                                     
292. One of Butler’s arguments was that in order for a waiver of rights to be effective, a custodial 
suspect had to say specifically that he was waiving his right to the presence of counsel or the right to 
remain silent. See Butler, 441 U.S. at 370–71. After all, Miranda does say that “[an] express 
statement that the individual is willing to make a statement and does not want an attorney followed 
closely by a statement could constitute a waiver.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966) 
(emphasis added). 
293. 479 U.S. 523 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
294. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2261 (referring to Barrett, 479 U.S. at 531–32). 
295. 512 U.S. 452 (1994). 
296. See Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2253–60 (discussing Davis, 512 U.S. at 455). 
297. Id. at 2253–54. 
298. Davis, 512 U.S. at 455. 
299. Id. at 461 (emphasis added). As Justice Sotomayor noted in her Thompkins dissent, “Davis’ 
holding is explicitly predicated on [the] fact” that the suspect’s equivocal references to a lawyer 
“occurred only after he had given express oral and written waivers of his rights.” Thompkins, 130 S. 
Ct. at 2275 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
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expressed concern that the majority might have assigned too much 
weight to the fact that the suspect had initially waived his right to 
counsel: 
Nor may the standard governing waivers as expressed in these 
statements be deflected away by drawing a distinction between 
initial waivers of Miranda rights and subsequent decisions to 
reinvoke them, on the theory that so long as the burden to 
demonstrate waiver rests on the government, it is only fair to 
make the suspect shoulder a burden of showing a clear 
subsequent assertion. Miranda itself discredited the legitimacy 
of any such distinction.300 
In the second place, there does seem to be a “principled reason” for 
using different standards for determining whether a suspect has asserted 
his right to remain silent or his right to counsel. As Justice Sotomayor 
expressed it in her Thompkins dissent: 
Advising a suspect that he has a “right to remain silent” is 
unlikely to convey that he must speak (and must do in some 
particular fashion) to ensure the right will be protected. . . . By 
contrast, telling a suspect “he has the right to the presence of an 
attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be 
appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires” . . . 
implies the need for speech to exercise that right . . . . 
. . . [The] Miranda warnings give no hint that a suspect should 
use [certain] magic words [to invoke his right to remain silent], 
and there is little reason to believe police—who have ample 
incentives to avoid invocation—will provide such guidance.301 
XIII. ALTERNATIVES TO MIRANDA 
As the Thompkins case illustrates, Miranda has been downsized and 
weakened in various ways. Oral statements obtained from custodial 
suspects who were never advised of their rights may be used to impeach 
them if they have the audacity to take the stand in their own defense. In 
addition, physical evidence derived from un-Mirandized statements may 
be used against defendants. So may prosecution witnesses whose 
identities or whereabouts would not have been known except for the 
defendants’ un-Mirandized statements. The fact that these exceptions to 
Miranda furnish law enforcement officials a strong incentive to 
                                                     
300. Davis, 512 U.S. at 470–71 (Souter, J., concurring, joined by Blackmun, Stevens and 
Ginsburg, JJ.). 
301. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2276 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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disregard Miranda does not matter. 
Moreover, although the Miranda Court was quite upset by the tactics 
recommended in the interrogation manuals, the present Court permits the 
police to interrogate custodial suspects before they waive their rights. As 
a result, the police may overwhelm, confuse, or trick custodial suspects 
into “waiving” their rights by interrogating them before they waive their 
rights. 
Has the time come to give up on Miranda and start over? Has the time 
come to accept the fact that Miranda does not—and never did—go far 
enough? Has the time come to recognize that Miranda—even the 
“original,” undiminished version—was fundamentally flawed? 
A.  Should We Provide Custodial Suspects More Protection than 
Miranda Does (or Ever Did)? 
Based on his experience as a public defender before entering 
academia, and discussions with many of his indigent clients, Charles 
Ogletree has underscored the need for a non-waivable right to the advice 
of counsel: “I would propose the adoption, either judicially or 
legislative, of a per se rule prohibiting law enforcement authorities from 
interrogating a suspect in custody who has not consulted with an 
attorney.”302 
The husband-wife team of Irene and Yale Rosenberg has made a 
proposal that goes still further. They maintain that statements made by 
custodial suspects to law enforcement officials should be inadmissible: 
(a) whether or not made in response to police questioning, (b) whether or 
not the suspects had earlier been advised of their rights by the police; 
and (c) evidently, whether or not they had earlier obtained the advice of 
counsel.303 
The Rosenbergs maintain that “suspects who are in custody cannot 
make truly voluntary or noncompelled confessions.”304 Although they 
recognize that “Miranda focused on the inherent coerciveness of 
custodial interrogation,”305 the Rosenbergs believe that “it is custody in 
and of itself that is coercive.”306 
                                                     
302. Charles J. Ogletree, Are Confessions Really Good for the Soul?: A Proposal to Mirandize 
Miranda, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1826, 1830 (1987). 
303. Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, A Modest Proposal for the Abolition of 
Custodial Confessions, 68 N.C. L. REV. 69, 75 (1989). 
304. Id. at 109. 
305. Id. at 110 (emphasis in original). 
306. Id. 
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Otis Stephens, Jr., has suggested still another possible solution to the 
police interrogation problem: “Probably nothing short of a blanket 
requirement that no suspect be questioned except in the presence of his 
attorney could be expected to remove the elements of psychological 
coercion to which the Court has so long objected.”307 
Although some of these proposals or suggestions go further than 
others, I believe they have one thing in common: No Supreme Court or 
Congress or state legislature would seriously consider any of them. 
The Warren Court was undoubtedly more concerned about protecting 
the rights of custodial suspects than any other Supreme Court in 
American history. As one commentator aptly put it, “[t]he history of the 
Warren Court may be taken as a case study of a court that for a season 
determined to employ its judicial resources in an effort to alter 
significantly the nature of American criminal justice in the interest of a 
larger realization of the constitutional ideal of liberty under the law.”308 
Nevertheless, this Court appears to have been so closely divided over 
the rights of custodial suspects that it was barely able to go as far as it 
did. According to one Justice who attended the March 1966 meeting on 
Miranda, if FBI agents had not been informing suspects of their rights 
for a number of years (although not as extensively as Miranda required), 
Chief Justice Warren’s views might not have been supported by a 
majority of the Court.309 
It is worth recalling that, twenty years after Miranda was handed 
down, Justice O’Connor, speaking for a majority of the Court, reminded 
us that Miranda “[d]ecline[d] to adopt the more extreme position [one 
advocated at the time by the ACLU] that the actual presence of a lawyer 
was necessary to dispel the coercion inherent in custodial 
interrogation.”310 The Miranda Court decided instead that “the suspect’s 
Fifth Amendment rights could be adequately protected by less intrusive 
means.”311 
Looking back at Miranda, Justice O’Connor emphasized that the 
opinion was not based on the premise that “the rights and needs of the 
                                                     
307. OTIS H. STEPHENS, JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND CONFESSIONS OF GUILT 205 (1973). 
308. Allen, supra note 43, at 525. 
309. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME COURT 589 
(1983). Professor Schwartz does not identify the Justice. However, he does quote Justice Fortas, a 
member of the 5-4 majority in Miranda, to the effect that the Miranda decision was “entirely” 
Warren’s. See id. 
310. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426 (1986); see also supra note 25. 
311. Id. 
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defendant are paramount to all others.”312 Rather, it “embodies a 
carefully crafted balance designed to fully protect both the defendant’s 
and society’s interests.”313 As I noted at the time, this is the way 
“Miranda’s defenders—not its critics—have talked about the case for 
the past twenty years.”314 
B.  Should We Give Up on Miranda and Reinvigorate the Old Due 
Process/“Totality of the Circumstances”/“Voluntariness” Test? 
As he points out, Charles Weisselberg has “long been an advocate of 
the Miranda decision and its theoretically bright-line rules.”315 But he no 
longer is. In an important article, Professor Weisselberg has spelled out 
the various ways the Supreme Courts that have succeeded the Warren 
Court have “effectively encouraged police practices that have gutted 
Miranda’s safeguards, to the extent those safeguards ever truly 
existed.”316 He concludes that the time has come to give Miranda a 
respectful burial “and move on.”317 
I agree with much of what Professor Weisselberg has to say about 
Miranda. For example, I share his concern (as any reader of this Article 
who has come this far with me would know) that we no longer have “a 
clean separation between administration of Miranda warnings and the 
use of interrogation tactics, at least not in the way the Miranda Court 
envisioned.”318 (Weisselberg wrote this two years before the Thompkins 
case was decided!)319 
I also agree with Professor Weisselberg when he points out: 
Observational studies and my review of training materials 
provide significant evidence that the warnings and waiver 
regime has moved at least partway into the interrogation 
process, contrary to the “time out” from the pressures of 
interrogation the Court imagined. Officers may use pre-Miranda 
conversation to build rapport, which is important to obtaining a 
Miranda waiver and—eventually—a statement. Officers may 
                                                     
312. Id. at 433 n.4. 
313. See id. (emphasis in original). 
314. Yale Kamisar, The “Police Practice” Phases of the Criminal Process and the Three Phases 
of the Burger Court, in THE BURGER YEARS 143, 150 (Herman Schwartz ed., 1987). 
315. Weisselberg, supra note 3, at 1524. 
316. Id. at 1521. 
317. Id. 
318. Id. at 1562. 
319. See the discussion of Berghuis v. Thompkins in supra notes 236–301. 
05 - Kamisar Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/14/2012  12:28 PM 
2012] THE RISE, DECLINE, AND FALL (?) OF MIRANDA  1025 
 
also downplay the significance of the warning or portray it as a 
bureaucratic step to be satisfied before a conversation may 
occur. There is also evidence that police often describe some of 
the evidence against suspects before seeking waivers . . . . 
. . . If more police seek “agreements [from suspects] to listen” or 
give warnings only after making a confrontation statement, then 
we may truly say that Miranda’s safeguards have been relocated 
to the heart of the psychological process of interrogation.320 
Professor Weisselberg also tells us that “the best evidence is now that 
a significant percentage of suspects cannot comprehend the warnings or 
the rights they are intended to convey.”321 To make matters worse, the 
Supreme Court has permitted the police officers who are required to give 
the Miranda warnings a good deal of leeway in doing so.322 
It would be hard to deny that the current state of the law governing 
the admissibility of confessions leaves much to be desired. But is 
Weisselberg’s response the correct one? He would give up on Miranda 
and “move on.”323 Move on to what? To the old due process/“totality of 
the circumstances”/“voluntariness” test—a standard that he hopes will 
be reinvigorated and provide a more formidable protection for custodial 
suspects than Miranda does.324 
First of all, before we return to full-fledged reliance on the 
“voluntariness” test, what institution will abolish Miranda? I am 
painfully aware that some Supreme Court Justices do not take Dickerson 
v. United States seriously.325 Nevertheless, in Dickerson, a 7-2 majority 
did inform us that “Miranda, being a constitutional decision of this 
Court, may not be in effect overruled by an Act of Congress.”326 Under 
these circumstances, I think it fair to say that there would be little or no 
support for another federal statute “overruling” Miranda. If Miranda is 
to be given a decent burial, the Supreme Court itself will have to conduct 
the ceremony. 
                                                     
320. Weisselberg, supra note 3, at 1562–63. 
321. Id. at 1563. According to the most significant study of Miranda warnings and mental 
disability, Morgan Cloud et al., Words Without Meaning: The Constitution, Confessions, and 
Mentally Retarded Suspects, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 495, 540–41 (2002), mentally disabled subjects 
“understood only about 20% of the critical words comprising the Miranda vocabulary.” 
Weisselberg, supra note 3, at 1570. 
322. See Weisselberg, supra note 3, at 1564 (discussing Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195 
(1989)). 
323. See supra note 317. 
324. See Weisselberg, supra note 3, at 1597–99. 
325. See supra notes 210–14 and accompanying text. 
326. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000). 
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So far as I can tell, the Court might overrule Miranda for any one or 
combination of three reasons: (1) a majority might believe that even a 
seriously weakened Miranda was still making life too difficult for law 
enforcement officials; (2) a majority might be sufficiently unconcerned 
about the rights of custodial suspects to pay even lip service to the 
privilege against self-incrimination or the right to counsel when a person 
is in the stationhouse; or (3) a majority of the Court might be willing, 
perhaps even eager, to give the trial courts a larger role in administering 
the law of confessions. As for reason (3), this is probably why the 1968 
statute that purported to abolish Miranda would have applied only one 
standard—the “voluntariness” test. As Steve Schulhofer has observed, 
this test “virtually invited [trial judges] to give weight to their subjective 
preferences” and “discouraged active review even by the most 
conscientious appellate judges.”327 
It is hard to see why a Court that was sufficiently disenchanted with 
Miranda to overrule it would want to reshape the old “voluntariness” 
test so that it furnished custodial suspects more protection than did the 
Miranda regime. Why, for example, would the Court that overruled 
Miranda want to use the “voluntariness” test to establish a cleaner 
separation between the giving of the warnings and the employment of 
interrogation tactics? 
Would there be any “warnings of rights” requirement at all under the 
new voluntariness regime? Would a Court that overruled Miranda be 
likely to require the police to advise custodial suspects of their rights all 
over again? If so, what reason do we have to expect that the percentage 
of suspects who comprehend the warnings would increase? 
As long as law enforcement officials administer the warnings, how 
can we expect them to advise suspects of their rights more clearly and 
more emphatically than they do now? If, in a world without Miranda, 
law enforcement officials are no longer required to give the warnings, 
suspects may still remember their rights from old TV shows. But 
eventually wouldn’t the percentage of suspects who know their rights 
decrease sharply? 
I did say recently that even if neither the Fifth Amendment privilege 
nor the Sixth Amendment right to counsel were deemed applicable to the 
states, the Supreme Court could still have provided custodial suspects 
more protection by turning to the old “voluntariness” test and reinforcing 
it.328 But I was discussing a very different Supreme Court than the one 
                                                     
327. Schulhofer, supra note 7, at 869–70. 
328. See Yale Kamisar, How Much Does It Really Matter Whether Courts Work Within the 
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we have today. I was talking about the Warren Court, a Court “greatly 
concerned about the many inadequacies of the prevailing test for the 
admissibility of confessions . . . and determined to do something about 
it.”329 But why would the current Court, one that has permitted Miranda 
to be weakened in various ways, want to fortify the voluntariness test so 
custodial suspects would receive greater protection? 
Apparently, Professor Weisselberg believes that state legislatures 
might do what the Supreme Court, and courts generally, have failed to 
do in recent years—provide custodial suspects with greater protection. 
“[M]ost importantly,” he tells us, state legislatures “might require 
videotaping, a movement that is gaining strength among the states.”330 
After a slow start, post-Miranda electronic recording of police 
interrogations has indeed gained strength among the states.331 But this 
movement is occurring while Miranda is still on the books. Noteworthy, 
too, is the fact that the first two states to require their law enforcement 
officers to tape custodial police interrogations, Alaska (1985) and 
Minnesota (1994), both did so by state court decision, not state 
legislation.332 
Moreover, a specific state may choose to record custodial 
interrogation for a reason peculiar to that state. For example, it appears 
that “the push” for tape recording in Illinois “arose from a spate of false 
confession cases and questionable interrogations that have plagued 
Illinois law enforcement and undermined the general public’s faith in the 
criminal justice system.”333 
                                                     
“Clearly Marked” Provisions of the Bill of Rights or With the “Generalities” of the Fourteenth 
Amendment?, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 513, 522–27 (2009). After all, the Warren Court told 
us that the fact that “a defendant was not advised of his right to remain silent or of his right 
respecting counsel at the outset of interrogation . . . is a significant factor in considering the 
voluntariness of statements later made.” Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 740–41 (1966) 
(emphasis added) (applying the “voluntariness” test on habeas corpus). 
329. Kamisar, supra note 328, at 525 n.59. 
330. Weisselberg, supra note 3, at 1597. 
331. BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT 248 (2011) (finding that “[at] least 500 
police departments now videotape interrogations. Police in these departments have reported positive 
experiences with videotaping and say that recording does not discourage a suspect’s cooperation”). 
332. Alaska required tape recording as a matter of due process under its state constitution. See 
Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156 (Alaska 1985). Minnesota followed when the state supreme court 
exercised its supervisory powers over state criminal justice. See State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587 
(Minn. 1994). Today, however, most of the nineteen jurisdictions that “require or encourage 
electronic recording of at least some interrogations” do so by statute. See GARRETT, supra note 331, 
at 248. 
333. Steven A. Drizin & Beth A. Colgan, Let the Cameras Roll: Mandatory Videotaping of 
Interrogations is the Solution to Illinois’ Problem of False Confessions, 32 LOYOLA U. CHI. L.J. 
337, 339 (2001). 
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The need for video and audiotaping would undoubtedly be great if the 
admissibility of confessions turned on the spongy, unruly 
“voluntariness” test.334 But electronic recording is also quite important 
under a Miranda regime. After all, “absent a recording, there is simply 
no way to adequately determine whether the police complied with the 
Miranda requirements [for example, gave the fourfold warnings at the 
appropriate time] or whether the suspect provided a knowing and 
voluntary waiver.”335 
It is not at all clear whether the demise of Miranda would lead to an 
acceleration of electronic recording of police interrogation. “[M]ost 
police departments still do not record interrogations, and many of those 
                                                     
334. Paul Cassell has forcefully argued that custodial suspects should be deprived of certain 
Miranda rights in return for a requirement that all police interrogators be videotaped. See Paul G. 
Cassell, Miranda’s Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 387, 486–96 
(1996). Under Cassell’s proposal, a suspect would be warned of his right to a lawyer, but only when 
brought before a judge. Moreover, police questioning could proceed whether or not the police 
obtained an affirmative waiver of the right to remain silent. Finally, the police would no longer be 
required to stop questioning suspects who tried to end the interrogation or sought a lawyer’s help. 
Professor Cassell asks: “[I]f you were facing a police officer with a rubber hose, would you prefer a 
world in which he was required to mumble the Miranda warnings and have you waive your rights, 
all as reported by him in later testimony? Or a world in which the interrogation is videorecorded and 
the burden is on law enforcement to explain if it is not . . . ?” Id. at 487. There is much to be said for 
videotaping police interrogations. Nevertheless, I am not happy with Cassell’s proposal. One reason 
is that I was quite disappointed by Miller v. Fenton, 796 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1986), one of the 
relatively few reported cases where the police interrogation was recorded. 
  In Miller, a 2-1 majority concluded that the confession made by the defendant (the prime suspect 
in a brutal murder case) was “voluntarily given.” Id. at 600. (Because the suspect had waived his 
Miranda rights, the court fell back on the “voluntariness” test.) However, the police interrogator 
repeatedly assured the suspect that he was not a criminal who should be punished, but only a 
mentally ill person who was not responsible for the murder or for anything else he might have done. 
Id. at 602. Moreover, although the 2-1 majority purported to consider the “totality of the 
circumstances,” it did not seem to take into account that at the end of the interrogation (an 
admittedly brief one), the defendant collapsed into a catatonic state and was rushed to a hospital. Id. 
at 604. 
  When it comes to the permissible use of police trickery and deception (which is frequently the 
issue when suspects waive their Miranda rights, as they often do), judges are likely to be far apart—
as they were in Miller v. Fenton. Therefore, I am inclined to agree with Steve Schulhofer. He 
recognizes (as I do) that videotaping is an extremely valuable tool (for both the police interrogator 
and the custodial suspect), but maintains that “without clear substantive requirements against which 
to test the police behavior that the videotape will reveal, the objective record will lack any specific 
legal implications.” Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda’s Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and 
Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 500, 556 (1996). 
  Moreover, it is unclear whether Professor Cassell’s proposal satisfies the need for a procedure that 
is as “effective” as the Miranda system “in securing Fifth Amendment rights.” See Dickerson v. 
United States, 530 U.S. 428, 440 n.6 (2000). 
335. LEO, supra note 2, at 300. For the view that there are three constitutional grounds for 
requiring police interrogations to be taped, see Slobogin, supra note 2. 
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who do tape selectively or only tape the admission.”336 Moreover, the 
FBI, “regarded by some as an exemplar of police professionalism, still 
refuses to record interrogations as a matter of policy.”337 Proponents of 
audio and videotaping are unlikely to best the FBI in state legislatures. 
Professor Weisselberg’s optimism about what might happen in a 
world without Miranda is not limited to visualizing a sharp increase in 
the electronic recording of police interrogation. He also tells us: 
One possible outcome [of the overruling of Miranda] might be 
legislation that directly regulates the police and affords greater 
protection to suspects than Miranda currently provides. A 
legislature might, for example, require warnings in very simple 
language and instruct police to give them prior to any suspect 
interviews or interrogations. It might prohibit some forms of 
deception by officers during interrogation.338 
What is the basis for such optimism? In the last 100 years, how often 
has Congress or the state legislatures demonstrated concern about the 
rights of custodial suspects facing police interrogation? 
Justice Robert Jackson once observed: “In Great Britain, to observe 
civil liberties is good politics and to transgress the rights of the 
individual or the minority is bad politics. In the United States I cannot 
say this is so.”339 Although Jackson made this comment more than fifty 
years ago, I still think it rings true. 
The Wickersham Commission Report—detailing the widespread use 
of the “third degree” by law enforcement officers—was published in 
1931.340 The “third degree” was “an affront to human dignity and a 
source of unreliable confessions.”341 Nevertheless, so far as I can tell, for 
the next thirty years neither Congress nor any state legislature even came 
close to passing any laws pertaining to police lawlessness in obtaining 
                                                     
336. LEO, supra note 2, at 296; see also Andrew E. Taslitz, High Expectations and Some 
Wounded Hopes: The Policy and Politics of a Uniform Statute on Videotaping Custodial 
Interrogations, 7 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 400, 401 (2012). 
337. LEO, supra note 2, at 296. 
338. Weisselberg, supra note 3, at 1597. 
339. ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 
82 (1955). Justice Jackson added: “[Any] court which undertakes [to] enforce civil liberties needs 
the support of an enlightened and vigorous public opinion which will be intelligent and 
discriminating as to what cases really are civil liberties cases and what questions really are involved 
in these cases. I do not think the American public is enlightened on this subject.” Id. 
340. NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN 
LAW ENFORCEMENT (1931) [hereinafter Wickersham Report]; see generally LEO, supra note 2, at 
41–77. 
341. Friendly, supra note 195, at 710. 
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confessions. (By the 1960s, of course, the Warren Court’s so-called 
revolution in American criminal procedure was underway.) 
At the time of the Wickersham Report (and for many years 
thereafter), federal law enforcement officers and most of their state 
counterparts were required to bring suspects promptly or “without 
unnecessary delay” to magistrates or commissioners so that they could 
be advised of their rights. Moreover, the judicial officers could decide 
whether there was good cause to hold the suspects for trial. 
Unfortunately, the prompt commitment requirements were not enforced; 
they continued to be “empty of force or consequence.”342 
However, Professor Zechariah Chafee, who had worked for the 
Wickersham Commission, made a relatively modest proposal: exclude 
any confession obtained by the police at a time when they were holding 
the suspect in violation of the prompt commitment requirement.343 Once 
again, as far as I can tell, neither Congress nor any state legislature 
seemed interested. 
But the Supreme Court was. A decade after Chafee had made his 
proposal, the Court in effect adopted it—in the famous case of McNabb 
v. United States.344 The McNabb case was heavily criticized by members 
of Congress.345 “Congress just reacted with a proposal—the Hobbs 
Bill—which was designed to overturn McNabb and which passed the 
House three times, but repeatedly died in committee in the Senate.”346 
Although McNabb was reaffirmed in Upshaw v. United States 
(1948)347 and again in Mallory v. United States (1957),348 criticism of the 
rule, which came to be known as the McNabb-Mallory rule, did not let 
up. As the authors of the most comprehensive discussion of the rule 
describe the reaction to Mallory: 
The Mallory decision was greeted by law enforcement officials 
                                                     
342. James E. Hogan & Joseph M. Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale and 
Rescue, 47 GEO. L.J. 1, 3 (1958). 
343. Zechariah Chafee, Remedies for the Third Degree, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov. 1931, at 621, 
630. 
344. 318 U.S. 332 (1943). The McNabb case did not rest on any specific provision of the 
Constitution. Instead, it was an exercise of the Court’s supervisory power over the administration of 
federal criminal justice. Justice Frankfurter and Chafee had once been colleagues on the Harvard 
Law faculty. Although Chafee’s article was not cited in McNabb, it is hard to believe that Justice 
Frankfurter did not read Chafee’s article before ascending to the Supreme Court. 
345. See generally Hogan & Snee, supra note 342. 
346. Note, Prearraignment Interrogation and the McNabb-Mallory Miasma: A Proposed 
Amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 68 YALE L.J. 1003, 1008 (1959). 
347. 335 U.S. 410 (1948). 
348. 354 U.S. 449 (1957). 
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of the District of Columbia (where its impact was greatest) with 
something bordering on panic. The Chief of the Metropolitan 
Police Department declared (hyperbolically, it is hoped) that the 
decision renders the Police Department “almost totally 
ineffective.” There were loud demands for a legislative re-
examination of the law of arrest, and in the Congress bills were 
introduced either to expand the period of allowable detention or 
to abolish the McNabb rule itself.349 
When one studies Congress’s reaction to the McNabb-Mallory line of 
cases, there is little reason to expect that body to fill the gap caused by 
the continued weakening (or overruling) of Miranda. Nor does the 
reaction of the states to the McNabb-Mallory rule provide much reason 
for hope either. 
Although McNabb was decided in 1943, not a single state followed 
the Supreme Court’s lead until the 1960s. Then, in the next twenty years, 
seven states did adopt some version of the McNabb-Mallory rule.350 But 
what I consider more significant than the number of states (and there 
were not many) is that all but one (Connecticut) did so by state court 
decision.351 
No survey of the politics of crime in America, however brief, would 
be adequate without mentioning Congress’s lopsided votes in support of 
the 1968 bill to “overrule” Miranda and reinstate the “voluntariness” 
test. As a strong critic of the Warren Court’s criminal procedure cases 
has recognized: 
[T]he situation with which the Court was confronted was 
sufficiently disturbing that those of us who fear that the Court’s 
answer will unduly hamper police interrogation ought to search 
hard for alternatives rather than take the easy course of returning 
simply to the rule that statements to the police are admissible 
unless ‘involuntary.’352  
                                                     
349. Hogan & Snee, supra note 342, at 17. A provision of 18 U.S.C. § 3501, the 1968 law that 
purported to “overrule” Miranda, Part (c), was aimed at the McNabb-Mallory rule. It states, in part 
that a confession by a person under arrest or detention “shall not be inadmissible solely because of 
delay in bringing such person before a magistrate judge . . . if such confession was made [within] 
six hours immediately following [the person’s] arrest or other detention.” 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) 
(2006). Moreover, the six-hour time limitation does not apply where the delay is found to be 
“reasonable” considering the means of transportation and the distance to be traveled. Id. See 
generally Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303 (2009). 
350. See generally Jerald P. Keene, The Ill-Advised State Court Revival of the McNabb-Mallory 
Rule, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 204 (1981). 
351. The Connecticut statute is discussed in State v. Vollhardt, 244 A.2d 601, 607 (Conn. 1968). 
352. Friendly, supra note 195, at 711–12. 
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Unfortunately, that is essentially what the Congress did. 
The “anti-Miranda” bill passed the Senate 72 to 4.353 The House vote 
was equally overwhelming. The House voted 317 to 60 against a 
conference and then 369 to 17 in favor of accepting the Senate 
version.354 
I trust I have said enough to explain why I share Don Dripps’s view 
that, as a general proposition, “so long as the vast bulk of police and 
prosecutorial power targets the relatively powerless (and when will that 
ever be otherwise?), criminal procedure rules that limit public power 
will come from the courts or they will come from nowhere.”355 
C.  Is the Best Solution Interrogation by, or in the Presence of, a 
Magistrate or Other Judicial Officer? 
In 1932—a long time ago considering the developments in criminal 
procedure that have occurred since then356—Professor Paul Kauper 
proposed that traditional police interrogation be replaced by judicial or 
judicially-supervised questioning.357 In the wake of Miranda, two 
eminent judges, first Illinois Supreme Court Justice Walter Schaefer and 
then Judge Henry Friendly, returned to the Kauper proposal and built 
upon it.358 Thus, Kauper’s proposal became known as the “Kauper-
Schaefer-Friendly” model.359 
Although Schaefer and Friendly revised some aspects of the 1932 
                                                     
353. See Kamisar, supra note 39, at 893. 
354. See id. at 894. One reason the House may have moved so quickly is that the very day it 
began consideration of the bill, Senator Robert F. Kennedy was assassinated. See id. at 893. A 
number of House members cited this event as a reason for prompt action. Id. at 893–94. However, 
the day after Robert Kennedy died, his legislative assistant, Peter Edelman, “angrily criticized” the 
attempt of some proponents of the crime bill “to cash in on the tragedy, pointing out that the bill 
‘contains measures that [Senator] Kennedy very deeply opposed.’” RICHARD HARRIS, THE FEAR OF 
CRIME 108 (1969). 
355. Dripps, supra note 200, at 45–46. 
356. For example, Kauper’s article was written four months before Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 
45 (1932), the famous right-to-counsel case, and four years before Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 
278 (1936), the Court’s first Fourteenth Amendment Due Process “coerced confession” case. 
357. Paul G. Kauper, Judicial Examination of the Accused—A Remedy for the Third Degree, 30 
MICH. L. REV. 1224 (1932). Although, as Kauper himself made clear, he was not the first to make 
the proposal, he was the first to evaluate with any degree of thoroughness the policy and 
constitutional issues raised by such a plan. See Yale Kamisar, Kauper’s “Judicial Examination of 
the Accused” Forty Years Later—Some Comments on a Remarkable Article, 73 MICH. L. REV. 15, 
15 n.3 (1974). 
358. See Friendly, supra note 195, at 708–16; see also WALTER V. SCHAEFER, THE SUSPECT AND 
SOCIETY 78–81 (1967). 
359. This model is discussed at considerable length in Kamisar, supra note 357. 
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Kauper proposal, one feature remained the same—”[t]he only sanction,” 
in the event the suspect refused to answer any questions when brought 
before a judicial officer, would be disclosure of this refusal at the trial.360 
In one respect, at least, the Kauper-Schaefer-Friendly plan and the 
McNabb-Mallory rule are related. Each is based on the premise that 
suspects should be taken out of the hands of the police (the danger 
period) as quickly as possible and brought before a presumably more 
neutral magistrate or other judicial officer. 
Professor Kauper balked at allowing a suspect’s lawyer to be present 
at the pretrial hearing before a judicial officer.361 One reason was that he 
thought it would take too long to arrange to have a lawyer at the 
suspect’s side. (It certainly would have in the 1930s, when there were 
few, if any, public defenders.) By the time counsel arrived, maintained 
                                                     
360. Friendly, supra note 195, at 713; SCHAEFER, supra note 358, at 80. 
  Three decades after Judges Friendly and Schaefer revised the Kauper proposal, Akhil Reed Amar 
& Renée B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. 
REV. 857 (1995), offered another plan, one which seemed to start out like the Kauper proposal, but 
then moved in a different direction. Under the Amar-Lettow proposal (criticized in Yale Kamisar, 
On the “Fruits” of Miranda Violations, Coerced Confessions, and Compelled Testimony, 93 MICH. 
L. REV. 929 (1995)), a suspect who refused to answer any questions at a judicially supervised 
pretrial hearing could be held in contempt. Moreover, even if the suspect were compelled to answer, 
whether at the pretrial hearing or in the police station, significant evidence might still be admissible. 
  Although the suspect’s compelled words could not be used against him, the evidence derived from 
such words—for example, the whereabouts of damaging evidence or the existence and identity of 
prosecution witnesses—would still be admissible. See id. at 858–59, 898–99. Why so? “Physical 
evidence  . . . can be introduced at trial whatever its source—even if that source is a compelled 
pretrial utterance” because “[a] witness testifies but physical evidence does not.” Id. at 900. 
  Some 120 years ago, the Court struck down a federal immunity statute because it merely 
prohibited the use of the testimony given—not the use of information derived from the compelled 
testimony. See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892); see also Ullmann v. United States, 
350 U.S. 422, 437 (1956). The Court has made plain that the use and derivative use of the 
compelled testimony is coextensive with the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination. See 
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); see also Kamisar, supra at 930–36. 
  The Court has forbidden comment on the refusal of a defendant to testify at his own trial because 
such comment amounts to “a penalty imposed by courts for exercising a constitutional privilege.” 
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965). Why would the Court allow a magistrate or other 
judicial officer presiding over a pretrial hearing to hold a suspect in contempt for refusing to 
answer? Whatever one’s views about the significance of Miranda, we are talking about something 
else—the contempt sanction—the power to compel a person to speak within the meaning of the 
Fifth Amendment. 
  Amar and Lettow contemplate a day when police interrogation no longer occurs in the 
stationhouse, only at a pretrial hearing presided over by a judicial officer. However, if the courts 
follow the lead of Amar and Lettow, I doubt that day will ever arise. If the courts allow the police to 
use the often-valuable evidence derived from an inadmissible confession, why would the police ever 
cease questioning suspects in the stationhouse? 
361. Kauper, supra note 357, at 1247. 
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Kauper, the interrogation before the magistrate would “lose its 
effectiveness” for “[i]ts value depends upon interrogation immediately 
upon arrest.”362 
It is understandable if a right to counsel at a judicially-supervised 
interrogation seemed neither “fair” nor “feasible” in 1932.363 But it 
seems both fair and feasible today. Therefore, although Judge Schaefer 
does not specifically consider this issue, Judge Friendly assumed 
Schaefer would require defense counsel to be present at the judicially-
supervised interrogation (as Friendly himself would).364 
Professor Kauper proposed that “a complete record should be kept of 
the interrogation”365 and that the suspect should be told that the entire 
record of the interrogation would go to the trial court.366 I am confident 
that if today’s technology were available when Kauper made his 
proposal eighty years ago, he would have required that the interrogation 
be electronically recorded. 
So far as I can tell, there has been sparse support for the Kauper-
Schaefer-Friendly proposal since Judges Friendly and Schaefer revived 
it more than forty years ago. One reason is obvious: If anything can 
doom a reform proposal, it is the need for a constitutional amendment to 
effectuate it. Because the Supreme Court had recently held that comment 
on the defendant’s failure to take the witness stand in his own defense 
constituted a violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause,367 both Friendly 
and Schaefer assumed that the plan they supported would require a 
constitutional amendment.368 
Whether an amendment to the Constitution is necessary to clear the 
way for the Kauper-Schaefer-Friendly plan is not perfectly clear. At 
least two commentators (Albert Alschuler and former federal judge 
Marvin Frankel) maintain that an amendment is not needed.369 On the 
other hand, several commentators believe Judges Friendly and Schaefer 
                                                     
362. Id. 
363. Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6 
(1956) (“Due process . . . at any given time includes those procedures that are fair and feasible in 
the light of then existing values and capabilities.”). 
364. See Friendly, supra note 195, at 713. 
365. Kauper, supra note 357, at 1248. 
366. See id. at 1240. 
367. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 
368. See Friendly, supra note 195, at 721–22; see also SCHAEFER, supra note 358, at 78. 
369. See Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective: The Right to 
Remain Silent, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2625, 2670–72 (1996); Marvin Frankel, From Private Rights to 
Public Justice, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 516, 531 (1976). 
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were right the first time.370 But whether the constitutional problems 
raised by the Kauper-Schaefer-Friendly plan are insurmountable short of 
an amendment, they seem formidable enough to discourage even reform-
minded state legislatures. 
Putting aside constitutional questions, I think there is another reason 
why few state legislatures, if any, would be attracted to the Kauper-
Schaefer-Friendly proposal. There are too many unanswered questions 
about (a) the role of the police officer who first meets the suspect at the 
police station, (b) the role of the police officer who takes the suspect to 
the site of the judicially-supervised interrogation, (c) the role of defense 
counsel who attends the judicially-supervised interrogation, and (d) the 
role of the magistrate or judicial officer who presides over the judicially-
supervised interrogation. 
It is not at all clear how much room the police officer has to maneuver 
when he first confronts the suspect or arrestee in the police station. 
Suppose the suspect blurts out an incriminating statement? May the 
police officer ask a follow-up question? Suppose, without any prodding 
on the part of the officer, the suspect informs the officer that he wants to 
tell him his “side of the story.” May the police officer listen? 
What, if anything, may the police officer say to the suspect when he 
drives him to the site of the judicially-supervised interrogation? May the 
officer engage in conversation with the suspect, so long as he or she does 
not touch upon the case? Or would even a conversation about the 
previous night’s baseball game or the news of the day be prohibited on 
the ground that the officer was trying to build a rapport with the suspect? 
Once the hearing before a judicial officer gets underway, what is the 
role of the defense lawyer?371 Will the lawyer be able to object to some 
questions (or any question) and warn her client not to answer? When a 
police officer tells a suspect that his accomplice has already confessed 
and is “putting all the blame” on the suspect, may the defense lawyer 
warn the suspect that this is an “old police trick”? Will the defense 
                                                     
370. See Donald A. Dripps, Forward: Against Police Interrogation—and the Privilege Against 
Self-Incrimination, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 699, 730 (1988); Phillip E. Johnson, A Statutory 
Replacement for the Miranda Doctrine, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 303, 309 (1987); Stephen A. 
Saltzburg, Miranda v. Arizona Revisited: Constitutional Law or Judicial Fiat, 26 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 
25 (1986). 
371. Because Professor Kauper operated on the premise that a defense lawyer would not be 
present at the judicially-supervised proceeding, he had no occasion to discuss the defense lawyer’s 
role. But he left no doubt that if a defense lawyer were present she would be able to act just as she 
does at the criminal trial itself. She would “urge [the client] to be guarded in his replies, encourage 
him to fabricate a denial or alibi, and make vexatious objections to questions put by the magistrate.” 
Kauper, supra note 357, at 1247. 
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lawyer be able to demand proof that her client’s accomplice has 
confessed? 
Finally, what about the role of the judicial officer who presides over 
the pretrial hearing? Even though a police officer or prosecutor will be 
doing the bulk of the questioning, may the judicial officer intervene at 
some point? Suppose the police interrogator tells the suspect or arrestee: 
“I’m your brother, you and I are brothers?”372 Or suppose the 
interrogator assures the suspect: “You are not a criminal; you are only 
someone who needs help, but I can’t help you unless you trust me?”373 
At some point, may the judicial officer interrupt the police officer even 
though the defense lawyer has made no objection? 
Whether defense counsel is allowed to attend the judicially-
supervised interrogation and act with the same freedom a defense lawyer 
has at the criminal trial itself may prove to be a decisive issue. Defense 
lawyers, public defenders, and civil libertarians are likely to be quite 
unhappy if the answer is in the negative. On the other hand, law 
enforcement officers are likely to be equally unhappy if defense lawyers 
are going to be allowed to block their efforts to obtain incriminating 
statements. Law enforcement officials are likely to emphasize a point 
Kauper made a long time ago—in order for police interrogation to be 
effective it must take place “immediately upon arrest.”374 
If it turns out that under the Kauper-Schaefer-Friendly plan, the 
defense lawyer will have as much freedom to defend her client at the 
pretrial hearing as she does at the criminal trial itself, then, in some 
respects, the situation will be similar to “the more extreme position” 
advocated by the ACLU, but rejected by the Miranda Court—requiring 
the defense lawyer to be actually present in order to dispel the coercion 
inherent in custodial interrogation.375 To be sure, the defendant who 
declines to speak at the pretrial proceeding will pay a price if the case 
goes to trial: the jury will be told that the defendant refused to speak at 
the earlier hearing. But how steep a price is this? 
Recently, the Supreme Court reminded us that “ours ‘is for the most 
part a system of pleas, not a system of trials’”—“[n]inety-seven percent 
of federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are 
the result of guilty pleas.”376 Nor is that all. Even if a defendant chooses 
                                                     
372. See Miller v. Fenton, 796 F.2d 598, 602 (3d Cir. 1986). 
373. See id. at 602, 609, 636. 
374. See supra note 361. 
375. See supra notes 310–14. 
376. Missouri v. Frye, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012). 
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to remain silent at the judicially-supervised interrogation, he could still 
testify at his trial. Moreover, I assume he could still tell the jury that he 
declined to speak earlier only because at that particular point in time his 
lawyer told him he lacked a complete grasp of the factual situation. 
Shortly after Professor Kauper and some others proposed a judicially-
supervised interrogation as a substitute for traditional police 
interrogation, “legislation was urged in several states.”377 What 
happened? 
According to Justice Schaefer: “Perhaps because constitutional 
doctrines did not then, as now, threaten the extinction of police 
questioning, the proposals met with public indifference or hostility. The 
police were especially hostile . . . .”378 
Justice Schaefer’s observations that constitutional doctrines 
“threaten[ed] the extinction of police questioning” in the 1960s needs 
some clarification. Although Schaefer’s lectures were delivered two 
months before the Miranda case was decided, they were published a 
year after Miranda was handed down. Nevertheless his book is based on 
the lectures as delivered. The lectures discuss neither the impact of 
Miranda on police interrogation nor how Miranda changed existing 
precedent. At the time Schaefer gave his lectures, the leading case was 
not Miranda, but Escobedo v. Illinois.379 And Escobedo did contain 
some broad, sweeping language—language that Schaefer and others 
believed did threaten police interrogation as we have come to know it.380 
                                                     
377. SCHAEFER, supra note 358, at 77. 
378. Id. 
379. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). 
380. To quote Justice Schaefer in his 1966 lectures, “the doctrines converging upon the institution 
of police interrogation are threatening to push on to their logical conclusion—to the point where no 
questioning of suspects will be permitted.” SCHAEFER, supra note 358, at 9; see also Arnold N. 
Enker & Sheldon H. Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v. United States and Escobedo v. 
Illinois, 49 MINN. L. REV. 47, 91 (1964) (voicing fears that the Court might be in the process of 
shaping “a novel right not to confess except knowingly and with the tactical assistance of counsel”). 
  I should add that Justice Schaefer and I had numerous conversations about police interrogation and 
confessions both before and after Miranda. We were both members of the Advisory Committee to 
the American Law Institute’s Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure project. In addition, we 
were fellow panelists at a number of gatherings and conferences about police interrogation and 
confessions both before and after Miranda. He was greatly concerned that the Court might 
ultimately abolish the institution of police interrogation. 
  Even after Miranda was decided (a case which seemed to retreat from the most sweeping language 
in Escobedo), Herbert Packer, one of the leading criminal procedure commentators of his time, 
observed: 
[I]t seems safe to predict that if the Miranda rule does not produce the intended effect of 
reducing the incidence of confessions, particularly by suspects who do not have the financial 
means to obtain counsel, the Court is likely to take the next step in the direction of the Due 
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If police interrogation “as we know it” ever faced extinction, it is safe 
to say it no longer does. In fact, police interrogation seems to be faring 
quite well. There may have been a time in the 1960s when some police 
officials or prosecutors were willing to “settle for” judicially-supervised 
interrogation, but that time has come and gone. Law enforcement will no 
longer settle for judicially-supervised interrogation. Neither, I submit, 
will the public. 
A FINAL REFLECTION 
Most of the Warren Court’s criminal procedure cases were strongly 
criticized when they were handed down. Mallory, Mapp v. Ohio,381 
Escobedo and Miranda quickly come to mind. Gideon v. Wainwright,382 
the famous right-to-counsel case, is a conspicuous exception. Why is 
that? 
Frank Allen once suggested that it was because Gideon was 
“supported by a broad ethical consensus.”383 I hesitate to disagree with 
Professor Allen because when I started writing about criminal procedure 
I found him more helpful than anyone else. But I doubt that the warm 
reception Gideon received had much to do with the “broad ethical 
consensus” supporting it. 
It is true that twenty-two states urged the Supreme Court to overturn 
precedent and to assure that all indigent persons being prosecuted for a 
felony be furnished counsel “as a matter of due process of law and of 
equal protection of the laws.”384 It is also true that when Clarence 
Gideon’s court-appointed lawyer, Abe Fortas, learned about the states’ 
amicus brief, he said he was “proud of this document as an 
American.”385 However, when Mr. Fortas read the states’ brief, he must 
have soon realized that it spoke only of the need for a defense lawyer in 
the courtroom: 
Any trial, but particularly a criminal trial, is a highly complex, 
                                                     
Process Model, which would be flatly to prohibit the use in evidence of statements given by 
suspects to the police. 
HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 194 (1968). 
381. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
382. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
383. Allen, supra note 43, at 540. 
384. ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON’S TRUMPET 150 (1964). The twenty-two states were led by 
Walter F. Mondale, Attorney General of Minnesota, and Edward J. McCormack, Jr., Attorney 
General of Massachusetts. 
385. Id. at 173. 
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technical proceeding requiring representation by a trained legal 
adviser . . . . The layman cannot, for instance, be expected to 
know procedure, whether to testify, how to cross-examine. The 
trial judge . . . can never be sure when, during the trial, the need 
for counsel will arise.386 
There are many problems in criminal procedure that are beyond the 
control of the courts. Anthony Amsterdam once observed: “[I]f the 
Court strikes down a police practice, announces a ‘right’ of a criminal 
suspect in his dealings with the police, God only knows what the result 
will be.”387 
But it is much easier for a judge to make sure that counsel is 
appointed than to see to it that Mapp or Miranda is honored. Moreover, 
a judge who sees to it that counsel is appointed does not have to face 
criticism that he “second-guessed” a police officer who had to make a 
quick decision. 
In a case like Gideon, another factor is at work—visibility. “One of 
the most powerful features of the Due Process Model,” Herbert Packer 
once observed, “is that it thrives on visibility. People are willing to be 
complacent about what goes on in the criminal process as long as they 
are not too often or too explicitly reminded of the gory details.”388 
Neither judges, nor other lawyers, nor spectators, like to see an 
untrained, uneducated criminal defendant floundering in the courtroom, 
trying to cross-examine a prosecution witness or trying to keep out 
certain evidence. But who sees the suspect in the so-called “interview 
room” in the early morning hours? Who sees the suspect being searched 
on a dark street or in an alley? 
Gideon did not start a new trend. Several years after Gideon was 
argued, Miranda came before the Supreme Court. This case, too, 
involved the right to counsel, but at an earlier stage of the criminal 
process—at the police station. This time, however, not a single state 
sided with Mr. Miranda. Instead, twenty-seven states signed an amicus 
brief against him. 
Justice Black once suggested that a person is in greater need of a 
lawyer when arrested than at any other time.389 If so, were the people 
                                                     
386. Brief for the State Government Amici Curiae at 4, Gideon, 372 U.S. 335 (No. 155) 
(emphasis added) (summary of argument). 
387. Amsterdam, supra note 41, at 791. Professor Amsterdam went on to say: “Out there in the 
formless void, some adjustment will undoubtedly be made to accommodate the new ‘right,’ but 
what the product of this whole exercise will be remains unfathomable.” Id. 
388. PACKER, supra note 380, at 242. 
389. See KAMISAR, LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 107, at 567 (oral arguments in Miranda). 
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who supported Mr. Gideon when his case was before the Court, and who 
applauded the Court’s opinion when it was handed down, really in favor 
of the right to counsel? Or were they only in favor of that right when it 
didn’t hurt too much? 
 
